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Isabel Grant* The Boundaries of the Criminal Law:
the Criminalization of the Non-disclosure
of HIV
In this paper, the author examines the trend toward the increased criminalization
and punishment of persons with HIV who fail to inform their stxual partners of
their HIV-positive status. Since the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v.
Cuerrier, such behaviour may constitute aggravated assault or aggravated sexual
assault, the latter offence carrying a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.
The paper surveys the Canadian case law and highlights the trend towards the
imposition of increasingly harsh sentences.
After reviewing public-health and criminal law options for dealing with non-
disclosure of one's HIV status, the author concludes that criminal law should only
be invoked in the most serious circumstances andonly where all other public health
measures have been exhausted. Criminal law should be reserved for individuals
who demonstrate a pattern of non-disclosure either over time or with different
sexual partners. The author also explores the social and legal reasons behind the
apparent contradiction that, despite the improved prognosis for persons with HIV
sentences for those who knowingly transmit the virus have become increasingly
severe.
L'auteure de cet article examine la tendance 1 la criminalisation accrue et I
I'imposition de sanctions plus s6vures pour les personnes porteuses du VIH qui
n'informent pas leurs partenaires sexuels de leur s6ropositivit6. Depuis I'arr6t
R. v. Cuerrier de la Cour supr~me du Canada, un tel comportement peut constituer
des voies de fait graves ou une agression sexuelle grave, cette derni~re infraction
6tant passible dune peine maximale d'emprisonnement i perp6tuit6. L'article
passe en revue la jurisprudence canadienne et fait ressortir la tendance 6
I'imposition de sanctions de plus en plus s6v~res.
Apr~s avoir examin6 les aspects qui touchent la sant6 publique et les possibilit~s
offertes par le droit p6nal face J la non-divulgation par quiconque de sa
s6ropositivitu, I'auteure arrive c la conclusion que des poursuites en droit p~nal
ne doivent 6tre entreprises que dans les situations les plus graves et uniquement
lorsque toutes les autres mesures en sant6 publique ont 6t6 6puis6es. Le recours
au droit p6nal devrait 6tre r6serv6 aux individus qui omettent c r6p6tition de
rdv6ler leur s6ropositivit6 au fil du temps ou avec diff6rents partenaires sexuels.
L'auteure examine en outre les motifs d'ordre social etjuridique qui sous-tendent
I'apparente contradiction entre le fait que malgr6 le pronostic de plus en plus
favorable pour les personnes s~ropositives, les sentences imposues i ceux qui
transmettent sciemment le virus sont de plus en plus ssvures.
* Professor, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia. The author would like to thank
Professors Janine Benedet, Peter Carver, Bruce MacDougall and Judith Mosoff for reading various
drafts of this paper. Thanks also to Anthony Purgas, Caily DiPuma, and Jody Barber for their diligent
research assistance and patient editing.
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Introduction
Over the past two decades, the social construction of HIV/AIDS has
gradually shifted away from a scourge that affects only gay men and IV
drug users towards recognition that HIV/AIDS is an illness to which we
are all susceptible. HIV/AIDS has defied attempts to draw lines on the
basis of gender or sexual orientation. This is not to say that the illness has
hit every community equally. In Canada, gay men and IV drug users are
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still the most likely to be suffering from HIV/AIDS. However, the gap is
narrowing.'
Despite this evolving construction of the illness, the criminal justice
system has taken an increasingly harsh view of those who do not disclose
their HIV-positive status to their sexual partners. In 1989, in one of
the first criminal cases involving non-disclosure, Gordon Summer was
convicted of one count of common nuisance and sentenced to ove year of
imprisonment plus probation after having sex with several complainants
without disclosing his HIV-positive status.2 Just over fifteen years later, in
2005, Johnson Aziga of Hamilton, Ontario was charged with two counts
of first-degree murder in the deaths of two women from AIDS. Aziga
allegedly had unprotected sex with both women without disclosing the
fact that he was HIV-positive.3 It was determined that there was enough
evidence to require him to stand trial on these charges.4 If convicted,
Aziga faces mandatory life imprisonment with a twenty-five-year period
of parole ineligibility.'
In this paper, I trace the journey from the relatively minor offence
of common nuisance to murder, our most serious crime, for the same
1. The state of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Canada is described by the Public Health Agency of
Canada:
[T]he number of heterosexual men and women infected through unsafe sex is also rising.
More women are being diagnosed with HIV and AIDS than in the past and now represent
an estimated 20 percent of all Canadians infected with HIV. Aboriginal people are also
over-represented in the epidemic and are almost three times more likely to be infected by
HIV than other Canadians. Other vulnerable groups include prisoners, at risk youth, and
people from countries where HIV is endemic.
Public Health Agency of Canada, The State of HIV/AIDS Epidemic in Canada (Ottawa: Public Health
Agency, 2006), online: Public Health Agency of Canada <http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/media/nr-
rp/2006/2006_05bkl e.html>. See also Andr6 Picard, "HIV rate soars among Vancouver's native drug
users" Globe and Mail (I February 2008), online: Globe and Mail
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.2008020 I.waids0l/BNStoryNational/
home>. This study revealed that the HIV rate among aboriginal IV drug users in Vancouver was twice
as high as that of non-aboriginal IV drug users.
2. R. v. Summer (1989), 98 A.R. 191, A.J. No. 784 (Alta. Prov. Ct.) [Summer]. Two of the
complainants tested positive for HIV.
3. He was also ordered to stand trial on thirteen counts of aggravated sexual assault against thirteen
women, seven of whom went on to test HIV-positive. R. v. Aziga, [2005] O.J. No. 5983 (Ont. Ct. J.)
(QL) [Aziga]. After several delays and changes of legal counsel, Aziga's trial began on 20 October
2008. See "Accused HIV Killer Pleads Not Guilty" Hamilton Spectator (7 October 2008) online: The
Spec <http://www.thespec.com/News/Local/article/44646>. See also R. v. Aziga (2006), 42 C.R. (6th)
42 (Ont. S. Ct. J.) where dying declarations from the two complainants in the murder case were ruled
to be admissible.
4. The basis for the first-degree murder charge was that the murders were planned and deliberate (s.
231(2) of the Criminal Code) or took place during aggravated sexual assault (s. 231(5) of the Criminal
Code).
5. Because he is charged with more than one count of murder, if convicted, he would not be eligible
to apply for a reduction in parole ineligibility after fifteen years.
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conduct: failing to disclose one's HIV-positive status to one's sexual
partner before having unprotected sex. While, unlike in the US, there has
been no new targeted offence enacted in Canada for dealing with this type
of conduct, courts and Crown prosecutors have taken an increasingly harsh
view of such conduct using existing Criminal Code6 provisions. Perhaps
most importantly, the Supreme Court of Canada has opened the door to
prosecutions through the crimes of aggravated assault and aggravated
sexual assault, the latter carrying a maximum life sentence.7
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether it is appropriate
to use criminal law as a tool for. controlling and punishing the failure to
disclose one's HIV-positive status to a sexual partner and, if so, how best
to ensure that the net of criminal liability is not cast too wide. I undertook
this project thinking that criminalization was appropriate in the context of
non-disclosure but that murder charges were excessive. As I learned more
about the issues, however, I came to recognize that criminalization raises
very difficult questions around public health, stigma, race, and social
disadvantage. I argue, therefore, that criminalization should only be used
as a last resort when all other public health measures have failed to control
the sexual behaviour in question.
Whether and how to criminalize the failure to disclose one's HIV status
raises questions about the purposes of punishment in a particularly difficult
context because of the disadvantage already experienced by persons with
HIV/AIDS. The solutions are complicated by the fact that we are dealing
with sexual activity where motivations are more difficult to assess. In the
majority of these cases, the accused appears to be motivated by the desire
to have (unprotected) sex, not by the desire to inflict harm.8
1. The nature of HIV/AIDS
Many of the academic papers referred to in this paper provide detailed
descriptions of the scientific basis of HIV/AIDS 9 and thus I only highlight
6. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 268,273 [Code].
7. Aggravated assault under s. 268 of the Code is punishable by a maximum term of fourteen years
imprisonment. Aggravated sexual assault under s. 273 is punishable with a minimum term of four
years imprisonment and a maximum life imprisonment.
8. See Harlon L. Dalton, "Criminal Law" in Scott Burris et al., eds., AIDS Law Today: A New Guide
for the Public (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993) 242.
9. See e.g. Damian Warburton, "A Critical Review of English Law in Respect of Criminalising
Blameworthy Behaviour in Individuals" (2004) 68 J. Crim. L. 55 at. 56-7; David P. Niemeier, "The
Criminal Transmission of HIV/AIDS: A Critical Examination of Missouri's HIV-Specific Statute"
(2001) 45 St. Louis U.L.J. 667 at 671-73; Amy L. McGuire, "AIDS as a Weapon: Criminal
Prosecution of HIV Exposure" (1999) 36 Hous. L. Rev. 1787 at 1791-94; Jaclyn S. Hermes, "The
Criminal Transmission of HIV: A Proposal to Eliminate Iowa's Statute" (2002) 6 J. Gender Race &
Just. 473 at 475-78; Jody B. Gabel, "Liability For 'Knowing' Transmission Of HIV: The Evolution Of
A Duty To Disclose" (1994) 21 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 981 at 983-87.
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a few facts which are necessary for the issues discussed hereafter. HIV is
a retrovirus that destroys immune cells, particularly CD4+ T lymphocytes,
and impairs overall immune response. Transmission of the virus may
occur when the bodily fluids of an infected person cross the mucous
membranes or get into the bloodstream of an uninfected individual. The
most common means of transmission are vaginal and anal intercourse,
sharing contaminated needles, and through blood transfusions. The virus
is also transmissible to a child through breast-feeding, and in utero from
a pregnant woman to her fetus. Casual contact, like sharing a toothbrush,
will not result in transmission.'0 Despite several criminal charges based on
biting and spitting in Canada and the United States, there are no recorded
cases of the virus being transmitted through these mechanisms. "
In the presence of HIV, the immune system will produce antibodies to
the virus, which is the basis for diagnostic tests for HIV; the point at which
antibodies can be detected in the body is known as seroconversion. After
infection with HIV, there is a period where an HIV test will not register a
positive result because seroconversion has not yet occurred, although the
individual can still transmit the virus to others. This period where the virus
is undetectable can extend to several months, although more commonly
seroconversion occurs within four weeks of infection. 2
HIV, the virus that causes AIDS, is transmissible to another person but
AIDS itself is not. AIDS is diagnosed when the number of CD4+ immune
cells is below a certain level or when an HIV-positive individual suffers
from one of a variety of severe opportunistic infections (e.g. Kaposi's
sarcoma).'3 New drug combinations, if instituted early and followed
rigorously, make it less likely that HIV will develop into full-blown AIDS,
or will at least delay the onset of AIDS. The use of antiretroviral drugs
10. "Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)" The Merck Manual for Healthcare Professionals
(November 2005), online: The Merck Manuals Online Medical Library
<http://www.merck.com/mmpe/secl4/chl92/chl92a.html> [Merck].
11. Richard Elliott, "Criminal Law, Public Health and HIV Transmission: a Policy Options Paper"
(Geneva: UNAIDS, 2002) at 24, online: UNAIDS <http://data.unaids.orgfPublications/IRC-pubO2/
JC733-CriminalLawen.pdf> [Elliott, "Criminal Law, Public Health and HIV Transmission"]. While
in detention, Johnson Aziga, after twice biting other inmates, was ordered into medical isolation.
Despite the low risk of infection, the hearing judge rejected Aziga's claim that the isolation constituted
cruel and unusual treatment or punishment under s. 12 of the Charter. See R. v. Aziga, [2008] O.J. No.
3052 (QL).
12. "Clinical Manual for Management of the HIV-Infected Adult: Primary H1V Infection" AIDS
Education and Training Center: National Resource Center (July 2006), online: AETC: National
Resource Center <http://www.aids-ed.org/aidsetc?page=cm-108_testing>.
13. Merck, supra note 10.
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also dramatically reduces the risk of in utero transmission.'4 We are still
learning about the impact of new medications on the lifespan of someone
with HIV.5
Despite the fact that HIV is transmissible through sexual intercourse,
the actual rate of transmission is lower than is generally assumed by the
public. Although it is impossible to come up with definitive numbers, it
is estimated, for example, that in vaginal intercourse where the male is
infected with HIV, the risk is approximately one in 1000 that the female
partner will acquire HIV in one act of sexual intercourse. Where the female
partner is infected, the risk to the male is much lower, approximately
one in 2000 for each act of intercourse.1 6 The risk in anal intercourse is
approximately one in fifty for the receptive partner (where the insertive
partner is infected) and one in 2000 for the insertive partner (if the
receptive partner is infected). When used correctly, condoms reduce the
rate of transmission by ninety percent or more such that the risk to the
receptive partner in anal intercourse is one in 500 instead of one in fifty.'7
Factors such as circumcision, the viral load of the infected partner, and the
health of the uninfected partner influence the likelihood of transmission.I8
These numbers should be kept in mind when considering the risk created
by certain kinds of conduct.
Non-disclosure, of course, does not transmit HIV Rather, it is a proxy
for not using a condom because we assume that disclosure would lead the
uninfected partner to take precautions or refrain from having sex with the
infected person.
2. Methodology-
This paper reviews the criminal law cases in Canada over the past eighteen
years, from 1989 until December 2007. These cases can be divided
chronologically into two groups: those that were decided before the
Supreme Court of Canada became involved in this area and those that
came after the. landmark decision of that Court in R. v. Cuerrier.9 This
14. Public Health Agency of Canada, Perinatal Transmission of HIV (May 2004), online: Public
Health Agency of Canada <http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/publicat/epiu-aepi/epi-updatemay_04/7_e.
html>.
15. Mike Stobbe, "Americans diagnosed with HIV can expect to live 24 years: study" Globe and
Mail (10 November 2006), online: Globe and Mail
<www.theGlobeandMail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20061 I 0.waids 110>.
16. Carol L. Galletly & Steven D. Pinkerton, "Toward Rational Criminal HIV Exposure Laws"
(2004) 32 J.L. Med. & Ethics 327 at 328.
17. Ibid. Although see R. v. Mabior, infra note 81.
18. Scott Burris et al., "Do Criminal Laws Influence HIV Risk Behavior? An Empirical Trial" (2007)
39 Ariz. St. L.J. 467 at 476.
19. [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371, [1998] S.C.J. No. 64 (QL) [Cuerrier cited to S.C.R.]
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review is limited to cases where HIV played a vital role in the definition
of the offence itself in contrast to cases, for example, where the accused
was HIV-positive but that fact did not form part of the underlying charge. 20
This paper focuses on the failure to disclose one's HIV-positive status in
the context of unprotected (vaginal or anal) intercourse. There are also
cases involving biting, spitting and using HIV-positive blood as a weapon 21
but these cases are much smaller in number and are only mentioned where
they are relevant to the issues involved in the sexual context.
I found approximately fifty cases involving non-disclosure in the
sexual context suggesting that prosecution is still a relatively rare event in
Canada, probably in large part due to difficulties in detecting such cases
and in proving specific offences. The burden on the complainant in going
to trial also creates a significant disincentive to prosecute. However, while
the number-of prosecutions remains relatively small, how the law responds
to these most difficult cases has implications for all persons with HIV and,
more broadly, for how our criminal justice system treats some of the most
vulnerable members of society.
After reviewing the pre- and post-Cuerrier cases, the paper examines
the arguments for and against the use of criminal law to control the failure
to disclose one's HIV status. The paper then moves on to examine the role
of public health law and criminal law respectively and to conclude that
criminal law should only be utilized where all other options have failed to
alter the conduct of the individual involved.
I. Canadian cases
1. The pre-Cuerrier case law
Between 1989 and the Supreme Court of Canada's landmark decision in
Cuerrier in 1998, I was able to find twelve cases dealing with individuals
20. The presence of HIV can be an aggravating factor in sentencing for sexual assault generally. See
e.g. R v. Winn (1998), 38 O.R. (3d) 159, O.J. No. 393 (QL) (C.A.).
21. R. v. Thissen (1998), 31 W.C.B. (2d) 176 (Ont. Ct. Prov. Div.), aff'd [1998] O.J. No. 1982 (C.A.)
(QL); R. v. Crane (2005), 129 C.R.R. (2d) 225, [2005] A.J. No. 292 (Alta. Prov. Ct.) (QL); R v.
Tremblay, (20 February 1994), Montreal 500-01-017674-935 (C.Q.) [Tremblay].
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charged with various offences for having unprotected sexual intercourse
without disclosing their HIV-positive status.2"
There were a handful of other cases which included conduct such as
donating blood knowing one is HIV-positive,23 smearing HIV-positive
blood on a prison guard,24 biting, 25 and stabbing the complainant with a
syringe allegedly filled with HIV-contaminated fluid.26 There are other
cases that defy easy categorization, for example, one which involved
Criminal Injuries compensation for three women who had been infected
with HIV from having sex with the same man, who had died prior to a
verdict in his trial2 7; and two others dealing with whether the HIV-positive
status of an accused who had been found not criminally responsible for a
criminal offence could render her a significant threat to others and thus
justify continued detention in a forensic psychiatric facility.28
In the pre-Cuerrier cases involving unprotected sexual intercourse,
all the accused but one were male and all but two of the complainants
were female.29 Thus only two cases involved homosexual relationships. In
seven of the twelve cases, the virus was actually transmitted to one or more
complainants.3 0 The majority of cases involved multiple complainants,
thus suggesting that.charges are more likely when the facts demonstrate a
pattern of behaviour. The charges in these early cases varied, ranging from
22. This number includes the trial decision in Cuerrier. Each case has been counted only once
regardless of how many levels of appeal it went through. Summer, supra note 2; R. v. Wentzell, [1989]
N.S.J. No. 510 (N.S. Co. Ct.) (QL) [Wentzell]; R. c. Langlois, 1991 WL 1137838 (C.Q.) [Langlois];
R. v. Lee, [1991] 3 O.R. (3d) 726, [1991] O.J. No. 3648 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)) (QL); R. v. Ssenyonga
(1993), 81 C.C.C. (3d) 257 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)) [Ssenyonga]; R. v. Kreider(1993), 140 A.R. 81, 1993
CarswellAlta 622 (Prov. Ct.); R. v. Mercer (1993), 84 C.C.C. (3d) 41, 110 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 41 (Nfid.
C.A.) [Mercer]; R. v. Bonar, unreported (See Salim Jiwa, "Mounties Allege HIV Man Negligent." The
Province (Vancouver) (8 June 1994) A5) [Bonar]; Tremblay, ibid.; R. v. Napora (1995), 36 Alta. L.R.
(3d) 22 (Alta. Q.B.) [Napora]; R. v. Hollihan (1998), 171 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 133, 525 A.P.R. 133 (Nfld.
Prov. Ct.) [Hollihan] and R. v. Cuerrier (1996), 83 B.C.A.C. 295, 141 D.L.R. (4th) 503, affg (1995),
26 W.C.B. (2d) 378.
23. R. v. Thornton, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 445 [Thornton].
24. R. v. Lesieur (1993), Quebec 200-01-008541 (Qc. S.C.).
25. R. v. Mitchell, [1998] O.J. 715 (Ont. Ct. J. (Prov. Div.)) (QL).
26. . v. Trudeau (26 April 1994), Montreal 500-01-475-944 (C.Q.); R. v. Tan (23 May 1995),
Edmonton (Alta. Q.B.), Ritter J., cited in Richard Elliott, Criminal Law and HIVAIDS: Final Report
(Montreal: Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network Society, 1997) [Elliott, Criminal Law and HIVI
AIDS].
27. Ontario (Attorney General) v. Ontario (Criminal Injuries Compensation Board) (1995), 22 O.R.
(3d) 129 (Ont. Sup. Ct. Just.) [Criminal Injuries Compensation Board].
28. Chambers v. British Columbia (Attorney General) (1997), 116 C.C.C. (3d) 406 (B.C.C.A.)
[Chambers]; K v. Mitchell, supra note 25. Note that the B.C. Court of Appeal held that this was
not the basis for finding someone to be a significant threat whereas the Ontario Court of Justice
disagreed.
29. The complainants were male in Langlois, supra note 22 and Napora, supra note 22.
30. Summer, supra note 2; Wentzell, supra note 22; Langlois, supra note 22; Ssenyonga, supra note
22; Mercer, supra note 22; Napora, supra note 22; Bonar, supra note 22.
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common nuisance on the low end to criminal negligence causing bodily
harm, sexual assault and aggravated assault on the more serious end."
There were convictions in six of the twelve cases: in two cases the accused
died either before trial or before the outcome of the trial, and charges were
stayed in one case. Two of the convictions were for common nuisance,
two for criminal negligence causing bodily harm, and one conviction for
assault causing bodily harm. The sixth conviction was for anal intercourse
with a minor. Four of the six convictions were the result of guilty pleas.
The sentences varied as well, ranging from one year of imprisonment
plus probation in the first case32 to eleven years in Mercer,33 which was the
first case to impose consecutive sentences for more than one complainant. 4
Most of the other cases lay somewhere between these two extremes with
a majority of offenders sentenced to penitentiary terms of imprisonment.
The number of the complainants, the number of incidents of sexual
activity, whether the virus was transmitted, and the trauma imposed on the
complainant w ere considered relevant factors in sentencing.
The fact that the early cases involve a variety of charges is probably a
reflection of the uncertainty about different elements of various offences
which led to a bit of a hit-and-miss approach in choosing charges. The
earliest cases utilized the charge of common nuisance, which involves
conduct endangering the life, safety, or health of the public and is
punishable by a maximum two years imprisonment. In Summer, the
Alberta Provincial Court held that endangering the individual complainant
could constitute endangering the public and hence the charge was made
out.35 In Napora,36 by contrast, the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench held
that there was no evidence that the accused had endangered the public (as
31. In two of the cases involving means of transmission other than sexual, such as fighting or
smearing blood, the accused was charged with attempted murder, although both accused were acquitted
on this charge because the intent to kill required for attempted murder could not be established. See
Tremblay, supra note 21.
32. Summer, supra note 2 (common nuisance).
33. The accused in Mercer, supra note 22, was charged with two counts of criminal negligence
causing bodily harm. He received five years on the first count and six on the second. The reason the
first count had a lower sentence was because the complainant continued to have unprotected sex with
the accused after becoming aware of his HIV status because she assumed she was already infected by
him.
34. Consecutive sentences can result in extremely high sentences in this context. See one of the later
cases R. v. Nduwayo, 2006 BCSC 1972, [2007] B.C.W.L.D. 2910 [Nduwayo]. Truscott, J. sentenced
the accused to twenty-five years based on seven consecutive sentences which was reduced to fifteen
years on the basis of time served and the principle of totality. The individual sentences ranged from
one to six years depending a number of factors including whether or not the virus was transmitted.
Nduwayo was granted a new trial by the B.C. Court of Appeal. See infra note 96.
35. The position in Summer, supra note 2, was followed in Hollihan, supra note 22.
36. Napora, supra note 22.
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opposed to simply the complainant) and thus the nuisance charge was not
made out.37 Later cases suggest that endangering the complainant suffices
to constitute endangering the public. 38 This result makes sense not simply
because the complainant is one member of that public but because future
sexual partners of the complainant may also be endangered.
39
A more serious charge found in the early cases is that of criminal
negligence causing bodily harm pursuant to section 221 of the Code, a
crime that requires the Crown to prove that the accused did some act (or
an omission where there is a duty to act) which showed wanton or reckless
disregard for the life or safety of another person. There is no freestanding
offence of criminal negligence in Canada; rather criminal negligence is
only criminalized where it causes death or bodily harm. Thus this offence
is only useful where there is proof that the accused in fact transmitted the
virus to the complainant. Criminal negligence causing death would only
arise in the rare case where the complainant dies before the accused is tried.
Homicide charges were extremely unlikely in the early cases because of
the rule in Canada that, to convict an accused of a homicide offence, the
Crown had to prove that the death occurred within a year and a day from
the acts of the accused. This rule was repealed in 1999, thus opening the
door to homicide charges. 1o
Causation is the most complex issue in criminal negligence or
homicide offences. How does the Crown prove that the complainant was
infected with HIV by the accused rather than some other source, such as a
prior sexual partner? In many of the early cases, the accused pled guilty or
at least admitted infecting the complainant(s), thus relieving the Crown of
its burden to prove causation. In Mercer,4 for example, where the accused
was convicted of two -counts of criminal negligence causing bodily harm,
he acknowledged that he transmitted the virus to both women with whom
37. The Supreme Court of Canada upheld a conviction for common nuisance in Thornton, supra
note 23, a case involving an HIV-positive accused donating blood without disclosing his status. In that
case, even though the risk was very small that the blood would make its way into the blood supply, the
endangerment of the public was more direct.
38. See R. v. Williams, 2003 SCC 41, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 134 [Williams (SCC) cited to S.C.R.].
39. The Napora Court explicitly rejected this view stating that the accused is not responsible for
the future sexual partners of the complainant. This conclusion may have been influenced by the
uncertainty as to whether the complainant was infected before having unprotected sex with the accused.
"So, if [the complainant], a potentially infected person, had high-risk sex with [the accused] and then
had high-risk sex with someone else, [the accused] cannot be held responsible for the [complainant's]
conduct with the someone else." Napora, supra note 22 at para. 13.
40. Code, s. 227, as rep. by Bill C-51, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, the Controlled Drugs
and Substances Act and the Corrections and Conditional Releases Act, I st Sess., 36th Parl., 1998, cl.
9 (assented to II March 1999), S.C. 1999, c. 5, s. 9.
4 1. Mercer supra note 22.
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he had numerous acts of unprotected sexual intercourse over an extended
period of time. Similarly, in Wentzell,42 also a criminal negligence case,
the accused pled guilty and did not challenge the assertion that he had
transmitted the virus to the complainant. In Ssenyonga, where the accused
did challenge causation, the accused and each of the complainants were
infected with a rare strain of HIV originating in Africa. The Crown argued
that this similarity, along with a detailed tracing of the complainants'
other sexual partners, was adequate to establish causation. The accused
died while awaiting the judge's verdict and thus no final conclusion was
reached on this issue. This technique of matching the DNA, known as
"phylogenetics," was also used in the preliminary inquiry in Aziga," where
the accused was alleged to have had unprotected sex with thirteen women,
seven of whom, along with the accused, were infected with a variety of
HIV that was known to be endemic to Uganda, the accused's country of
origin. Phylogenetics has also been used in United States prosecutions 44
and it is likely that this technique will be used with increasing frequency
as its specificity increases and our understanding of the virus and how it is
transmitted develops. It is important to note, however, that this technique
can show similarities in the virus between individuals but cannot show the
direction of transmission, i.e., who got the virus from whom or whether
both an accused and a complainant acquired the virus from a third party.
The most common charge in the early cases is some form of assault,
either sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault or aggravated assault.
There have been six charges of some form of assault in the early cases but
only two convictions. These offences do not have a causation requirement
and thus, in theory, could apply whether or not the virus was transmitted.
The biggest obstacle in these cases, up until 1998, was the proof of non-
consent which is an essential element of all assault-based offences. In
all of the cases at issue, the complainant appeared to have consented to
sexual activity in the usual sense that we understand consent, i.e., the
complainant, albeit with limited knowledge of the circumstances, wanted
the sexual activity to take place.45
However, the doctrine of fraud can negate consent to a touching, either
sexual or otherwise. This rule is codified in s. 265(3)(c) of the Code and
has been developed at common law. At common law, fraud only negated
consent where the fraud went to the nature of the sexual act or to the
42. Wentzell, supra note 22.
43. Aziga, supra note 3.
44. Thomas C. Shevory, Notorious H. V: The Media Spectacle of Nushawn Williams (Minnesota:
University of Minnesota Press, 2004).
45. R v. Ewanchuik, [1999] ! S.C.R. 330, [1999] 5 W.W.R. 333.
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identity of the sexual partner.46 This was a very narrow exception and
would not apply where the complainant knew that she or he was having
sexual intercourse and with whom. The Criminal Code definition of fraud
reflected this narrow view until 1983 when the crime of rape was replaced
with sexual assault. Prior to that time, consent was vitiated where it was
obtained "by false and fraudulent representations as to the nature and
quality of the act." In 1983 this definition was replaced by s. 265(3)(c),
which simply provides that there is no consent where the complainant
submits by reason of fraud. The question raised in the early HIV cases
was whether this legislative change was meant to abolish and/or broaden
the previously established narrow definition of fraud.
Most of the early cases involving assault-based charges were
unsuccessful because of the apparent consent given by the complainant to
engage in sexual activity. In Ssenyonga, for example,47 McDermid J. held
that fraud could not vitiate consent in these circumstances because the
complainants knew they were having sex with the accused and consented
to that activity. The Court held that the law of assault is too blunt an
instrument to control the spread of HIV.48
Overall, the small number of early cases reflects the uncertainty of
the law in relation to consent. That uncertainty evaporates, although not
without complications, after the Supreme Court of Canada decision in R.
v. Cuerrier.
2. Re-thinking fraud and its relation to consent: R. v. Cuerrier
In the 1998 decision of R. v. Cuerrier, 49 the Supreme Court of Canada
opened the door to prosecutions for various levels of assault in cases
involving non-disclosure of HIV status. The accused had tested positive
for HIV in August 1992 and had been instructed by a public health nurse
to use condoms and to inform all prospective partners of his HIV-positive
status. He rejected this advice saying that he would never have a sex life
if he disclosed his HIV-positive status. Three months later he began an
eighteen-month relationship with one of the complainants during which
they had unprotected sex more than one hundred times. The accused told
the complainant near the beginning of the relationship that he had tested
negative for HIV months earlier. The following year, when the complainant
developed hepatitis, both the complainant and the accused were tested
46. R. v. Clarence (1888), 22 Q.B.D. 23.
47. June Callwood, Trial Without End: A Shocking Story of Women and AIDS (Toronto: Knopf
Canada, 1995). Callwood suggests that Ssenyonga may have transmitted the virus to as many as one
hundred women.
48. Ssenyonga, supra note 22.
49. Supra note 19.
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for HIV. The complainant tested negative and the accused positive. The
accused was again warned about instructing his sexual partners as to his
HIV-positive status. The two continued to have unprotected sex although
the complainant testified that she would never have engaged in unprotected
sex with the accused in the first place if she had known his HIV status.
Soon after this relationship ended, the accused started a new relationship
and had unprotected sex with the second complainant without disclosing
his HIV status. Like the first complainant, she testified at trial that, had she
known of the accused's HIV status, she would not have had unprotected
sexual intercourse with him. At the time of trial, neither woman had tested
positive for HIV. The trial court and the British Colombia Court of Appeal
held that the charge of aggravated assault could not be made out because
the complainants had consented to the sexual activity with the accused.
The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown appeal. It held
unanimously that the accused's failure to disclose his HIV-positive status
to the complainants constituted fraud and hence vitiated consent to sexual
activity. The Court sent the case back to trial on the charge of aggravated
sexual assault.5 0
Mr. Justice Cory, for the majority,5' applied the criminal law definition
of commercial fraud to the consent issue. The non-disclosure of the
accused's HIV status was fraudulent because it involved a deceit which
caused harm to the complainant. The majority was concerned about an
overly broad interpretation of fraud that would encompass potentially
trivial harms. In response to this concern it added a requirement that the
harm in question must constitute a significant risk of serious bodily harm.
Fraud that does not lead to a significant risk of serious harm might be
the basis for a civil action but not for criminal liability for sexual assault.
The majority held that, in getting rid of the express limits on the word
fraud, Parliament had intended to get away from the narrow common-law
definition. Despite this holding, the majority took a very narrow view of
what constitutes harm.
The minority decision of then Madam Justice McLachlin (Gonthier J.
concurring) took a narrower approach to fraud, upholding the common-
law definition but extending it incrementally to include deception as to
sexually transmitted diseases, because this kind of deception goes to the
very nature of the sexual act. McLachlin J. was particularly critical of Cory
J.'s imposed limit requiring a significant risk of serious bodily harm:
50. The Crown decided not to retry the accused.
51. Major, Bastarache, and Binnie JJ. concurring.
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This limitation, far from solving the problem, introduces new difficulties.
First, it contradicts the general theory that deception coupled with risk
of deprivation suffices to vitiate consent. A new theory is required to
explain why some, but not all kinds of fraud, convert consensual sex into
assault. Yet none is offered. Second, it introduces uncertainty. When is
a risk significant enough to qualify conduct as criminal? In whose eyes
is "significance" to be determined - the victim's, the accused's or the
judge's? What is the ambit of "serious bodily harm"? Can a bright line be
drawn between psychological harm and bodily harm...?52
McLachlin J. would have returned to the pre-Clarence common law where
deception about sexually transmitted diseases did negate consent. She
would impose an objective test of whether the accused falsely represented
to the complainant that he or she did not have HIV when he or she knew
or ought to have known that this was false. 3
Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 adopted the broadest definition of
fraud which, in her view, best promoted sexual autonomy by enabling
people to make their own choices about their bodily integrity. In her view,
the essential issue was whether the dishonesty induced the complainant to
consent:
[F]raud is simply about whether the dishonest act in question induced
another to consent to the ensuing physical act, whether or not that act
was particularly risky and dangerous. The focus of the inquiry into
whether fraud vitiated consent so as to make certain physical contact
non-consensual should be on whether the nature and execution of the
deceit deprived the complainant of the ability to exercise his or her will
in relation to his or her physical integrity with respect to the activity in
question.5 4
The other members of the Court criticized L'Heureux-Dub6 J.'s judgment
as being too broad because it could criminalize deceits which are too
trivial to warrant criminal sanction. For example, if an individual lied
about his marital status or about his feelings for the complainant and these
lies induced the complainant's consent, this could constitute fraud under
L'Heureux-Dub6 J.'s formulation.
Regardless of the significant differences among the three judgments,
Cuerrier makeg clear that failure to disclose that one is HIV-positive
constitutes fraud negating consent. None of the justices explicitly drew a
52. Cuerrier, supra note 19 at para. 48.
53. Ibid at para. 70.
54. Ibid. at para. 16.
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distinction between non-disclosure and deliberate lying about one's HIV
status.55
The expansion of the doctrine of fraud addresses the non-consent
element of assault charges. However, aggravated assault, the charge in
Cuerrier, requires that the accused endanger the life of the complainant. The
majority held that Cuerrier had endangered the lives of the complainants
by knowingly exposing them to the risk of infection by HIV. In the context
of aggravated assault, therefore, we are left with a double requirement
of risk of harm. First, in order to negate consent to establish an assault
of any level, the Crown must prove that there was a significant risk of
serious bodily harm. In order to establish that there was an aggravated
assault, the Crown must establish that the conduct endangered the life of
the complainant.
The double requirement of risk of harm in Cuerrier-first to establish
an assault, and then to establish aggravated assault-means that where
it cannot be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant was
HIV-negative at the time of the sexual relationship with the accused, it will
not be possible to prove even the.lowest form of sexual assault because
that offence requires proof of a significant risk of serious bodily harm in
order to establish fraud. If the complainant tests positive for HIV, the fact
that she had a negative test prior to sex with the accused is no guarantee
that she was not in the window of time between the presence of the virus
in the blood and its detectability through testing. The need for the Crown
to establish that the complainant was not HIV-positive at the time they
had sex opens the door to and in fact requires the Crown to go through the
complainant's sexual history (and possibly drug-use history) in some detail.
This is humiliating for the complainant and her other sexual partners. It
may also be difficult to trace every sexual partner and to have them tested
for HIV, especially where their consent is not forthcoming.
The Crown will have a much easier time proving its case where the
complainant never tests positive for HIV. Sexual history evidence will not
be necessary where the- complainant does not have HIV and the risk of
harm will be much easier to prove because it is obvious that unprotected
sex endangers a complainant who is HIV-negative. Thus, complainants for
whom there is a higher risk that they were HIV-positive before engaging in
sexual activity with the accused, such as gay men, sex workers or IV drug
users, will have less recourse to the criminal justice system. If we require
the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant was
55. Only the minority decision of McLachlin J. referred to a false representation although she does
not make clear whether non-disclosure is equivalent to misrepresenting one's HIV status.
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HIV-negative when she had sex with the accused and that she contracted
the virus from the accused, it may never be possible to meet the Cuerrier
requirements for such complainants. If the law is going to criminalize the
failure to disclose one's HIV-positive status in order to respect the. right
of the complainant to make his or her own decision about engaging in
high-risk activity, then surely it should do so for all complainants, not just
those who we can be sure were not infected previously. This is particularly
true given that persons at highest risk tend to be those members of groups
already facing disadvantage in our society. Sex workers, for example,
are particularly vulnerable to sexual violence. The non-disclosure cases
following Cuerrier illustrate the importance of the complainant's HIV
status in conviction as well as other troublesome issues.
3. Post-Cuerrier developments
a. Introduction
I found thirty-eight cases where charges were laid after the Supreme
Court's decision in Cuerrier and before December 2007, over a threefold
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increase from the earlier period.16 All but three of the accused in this later
group were male. At least eight cases included male complainants (one case
had both male and female complainants). Several cases involved multiple
complainants, particularly where the complainants were female. Of the
56. For the purpose of completeness, some references are made to cases after December 2007.
However, none of these cases are included in the analysis of the numbers. Where a case citation has
not been found a reporting newspaper is cited followed by, in parentheses, the name of the accused,
the court or province, and, where available, the docket number and judge. Williams (SCC), supra
note 38; R. v. Edwards, 2001 NSSC 80, (2001) 194 N.S.R. (2d) 107 [Edwards cited to CarswellNS];
R. v. S.(F), 2006 CarswellOnt 1539 (C.A.) [cited to CarswellOnt], aff'g 2005 CarswellOnt 8329 (Sup.
Ct. .Just.), aff'g 2004 CarswellOnt 8210 (Ct. Just.) [S.(EF)]; R. v. Walkem, [2007] OJ. No. 186 (Ct.
Just.) (QL) [Walkem]; R. v. Williams (Ian), 2006 CarswellOnt 833 (Ct. Just.) [Williams (Ian)]; R. v.
Clarke (20 May 2005), Toronto 606/04 (Ont. Sup. Ct. Just.); R. v. Booth, 2005 ABPC 137, 382 A.R.
116 [Booth]; R. v. Trevis Smith, [2007] S.J. No. 116 (Sask. Prov. Ct.) (QL); aff'd. 2008 SKCA 61; R. v.
MacKay, 2007 CarswellOnt 2532 (Sup. Ct. Just.); Nduwayo, supra note 34; Aziga, supra note 3; R. v.
Rene Smith, 2004 BCCA 657, 206 B.C.A.C. 262; R. v. DeBlois, [2005] O.J. No. 2267 (Ont. Ct. Just.)
(QL) [Deblois]; R. v. Murphy, 2005 WL 3385170 (Ont. Sup. Ct. Just.) [Murphy]; R. v. Lamirande,
2006 MBCA 71, 2006 CarswellMan 224 [Lamirande]; R. v. Charbonneau' (18 June 2002), Ottawa
01/13048 (Ont. Ct. Just.); R. v. Miron (2000), 174 Man. R. (2d) 52, [2000] M.J. No. 500 (Man. Prov.
Ct,) (QL) [Miron cited to Man. R. (2d)]; R. v. Agnatuk-Mercier, [2001] WL 34066691 (Ont. Sup. Ct.
Just.) [Agnatuk-Mercier]; Douglas Quan, "Man with HIV Guilty of Assault: Gatineau Man Failed
to Disclose Status Before Having Sex" Ottawa Citizen (21 October 2000) C4 (Eric Maisonneuve;
Qc. Sup. Ct., Lapointe J.); Chris Purdy, "Judge Warns HIV-Positive Man to Curb his Sex Habits"
Edmonton Journal (28 March 2001) B4 (Fabian Bear; Alta. Q.B., Trussler J.); "Man Sentenced to
Six Years for HIV Infection" Vancouver Sun (7 June 2001) A5 (Mario Morin; Qc., Trudel, J., 410-
01-006308-992); "Man Jailed for Infecting 3 with HIV" Toronto Star (28 June 2002) A4 (Edgard
Monge; Ont., 27 June 2002, Gilthero J.); "Woman with AIDS had Unprotected Sex" Calgary Herald
(21 December 2002) A13 (Lounge Wanderingspirit; Alta., Peck J); "Male Prostitute Sentenced to 16
Years for Spreading HIV" National Post (21 January 2003) AI I (Calvin Chartier; Qc., 500-01-6309-
014); "H1V-positive Man Pleads Guilty to Aggravated Assault after Having Unsafe Sex" Canadian
Press (14 July 2003) (Edward Kelly; Ont., 13 July 2003, McGrath J.); "Man with AIDS gets jail after
unprotected sex" Daily News (Halifax) (1 May 2004) (Navrumba Djamali; Qc., 500-01-000091-022,
Garneau J.); "HIV-positive Winnipeg Man jailed for 2 years for having sex with woman" Canadian
Press (18 May 2004) (Marc Bedard; Man.); "HIV-positive Toronto man charged with assault for
having unprotected sex" Canadian Press (17 May 2005) (Michael Stevens; Ont.); "HIV-positive man
avoids jail for assault: Victims, accused all mentally challenged" Windsor Star (5 January 2006) C7
(Normand Beaudoin; Ont., Ratushny J.) [Beaudoin]; Don Lajoie, "Judge tosses HIV assault case"
Windsor Star (10 March 2006) A3 (Ian McKenzie; Ont. Sup. Ct. Just., Donohue J.); Doug Schmidt
"'I'm clean,' he told victims: Some given pills and blacked out" Windsor Star (28 April 2007) Al (Carl
Leone; Ont., Demarco J.); "HIV-positive Winnipeg man may have had sex with as many as 45 people:
police" Canadian Press (7 April 2006) (Clato Mabior; Man.); "HIV perp gets 40 months for sex with
4 TO. women" Toronto Sun (10 March 2007) 3 (Howard Matthews; Ont., Marshall J.); Matthew
Ramsey "Woman charged with assault: Charge alleges prostitute had unprotected sex" Province
(Vancouver) (24 August 2006) A28 (Michelle Whonock; B.C.); "HIV-positive woman charged with
assault" Globe and Mail (23 March 2007) Al7 (Robin Lee St. Clair; Ont.); Sam Pazzano "Jail Urged
for HIV Wife: Ex-stripper who infected husband blames her own ignorance" Toronto Sun (11 July
2007) 12 (Suwalee lamkhong; Ont., Ducharme J.); Sunny Freeman "HIV-positive youth jailed after
deceiving partner" Vancouver Sun (4 November 2007) BI (J.M.L.; B.C., Brecknell J.); Robin Perelle
"HIV case in court" Xtra West (12 September 2007), online:
<http://www.xtra.ca/public/viewstory.aspx?AFFTYPE=4&STORYID=3598&PUBTEMPLATE
-
ID=I>.
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thirty-eight, information is available on the outcome of the prosecution in
thirty-one of the cases. The remaining seven are either ongoing or I was
unable to find the necessary outcome information. All of those thirty-one
accused were charged with either aggravated assault or aggravated sexual
assault. In some cases other charges were also laid including nuisance,"
criminal negligence causing bodily harm,5" and even murder. 9 Of the
thirty-one cases, convictions were obtained in twenty-six, there were
four acquittals60 and there was one case where the accused was acquitted
on the HIV-related count but convicted of sexual assault causing bodily
harm after having sex with and transmitting gonorrhea to his five-year-old
daughter.6' More than half of the twenty-six convictions involved guilty
pleas. The virus was transmitted in fifteen of these thirty-one cases to at
least one complainant and often to more than one.
b. The Supreme Court's second look: R. v. Williams
The invocation of criminal law seems most appropriate where there has
been lasting harm caused to the complainant. Yet, as described above,
cases involving HIV-negative complainants will be easier to prosecute
than those where the complainant contracts the virus. This dilemma is
highlighted by the 2003 decision of Williams, 62 where the Supreme Court
of Canada again addressed the criminal liability of a man who, knowing
he was HIV-positive, engaged in repeated acts of unprotected sex without
disclosing his status.
Williams was charged with aggravated assault, common nuisance,
and criminal negligence causing bodily harm. The accused had lived
with the complainant, during which time they engaged in unprotected
sex. Approximately six months into the relationship the accused tested
positive for HIV. He did not tell his partner that he had tested positive
nor did he reveal his relationship with her to his doctors. He continued
to have unprotected sex with the complainant for another twelve months.
Thus, unlike in Cuerrier, the accused engaged in unprotected sex with the
complainant both before and after he learned of his HIV-positive status.
The complainant tested HIV-positive two years after the relationship ended.
The complainant had tested negative around the time the accused had been
tested but because it may take up to six months for HIV to be detectable
57. Williams (SCC), supra note 38; Booth, ibid.; Beaudoin, ibid.
58. Nduwayo, supra note 34; Williams (Ian), supra note 56.
59. Aziga, supra note 3.
60. Agnatuk-Mercier, supra note 56; R. v. Bear, as described by Purdy, supra note 56; Edwards,
supra note 56, R. v. McKenzie, as described by Lajoie, supra note 56.
61. S.(F), supra note 56.
62. Supra note 38.
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in the blood, she could have been HIV-positive even though she tested
negative. Thus it was impossible to determine whether the complainant
had been infected before the accused discovered he was HIV-positive or
after. If she was infected before he discovered his status, the Crown could
not prove that he endangered her life (actus reus) at a time when he knew
he was HIV-positive (mens rea).
At trial, Williams was convicted of aggravated assault and nuisance but
acquitted of criminal negligence causing bodily harm. The Newfoundland
and Labrador Court of Appeal, in a two to one decision, quashed the
conviction for aggravated assault and substituted a conviction for attempted
aggravated assault.63 The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously agreed
with the majority of Court of Appeal.
Binnie J., for the Court, held that Williams could not be convicted
of aggravated assault because that offence requires, as part of the actus
reus, that the accused endanger the life of the complainant. In order for
the actus reus and the mens rea to go together, this endangerment had to
take place after the accused knew he was HIV-positive. Expert evidence
suggested that it was likely that the complainant was infected before the
accused knew with certainty of his HIV-positive status. Thus, there was
at least a reasonable doubt about whether, when he endangered her, he
knew his HIV-positive status.' The Court pointed to the apparent paradox
that Cuerrier was convicted of aggravated assault even though he did
not transmit the virus to either complainant whereas Williams, who did
transmit the virus, could not be convicted of the completed offence. The
Court's explanation was that timing was critical:
The paradox is resolved, however, when it is recognized that in Cuerrier,
the accused was deceitful about his HIV status from the beginning of the
sexual relationship whereas here, at the likely time of the complainant's
HIV infection, she was freely engaging in unprotected sex with a partner
who was unaware of his own HIV condition and certainly unaware that
he was placing the complainant at risk.6"
63. Williams v. R., 2001 NFCA 52, 158 C.C.C. (3d) 532 [Williams (NFCA)].
64. There is also a significant question about the mens rea for attempts which has been discussed
elsewhere. See generally Isabel Grant, "Developments in Substantive Criminal Law: The 2003-
2004 Term" (2004) 26 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 215 at 239-49; Simon Verdun-Jones & David MacAlister,
"Unprotected Sexual Intercourse with Knowledge of HIV-Positive Results: Attempted Aggravated
Assault of the Need for Legislative Reform" (2003) 13 C.R. (6th) 257.
65. Williams (SCC), supra note 38 at para. 54.
142 The Dalhousie Law Journal
c. Problems with Cuerrier and Williams
The HIV-positive complainant
It is troubling that, had Williams never infected the complainant, he could
have been convicted of the completed offence of aggravated assault.
This problem is highlighted by its impact on sentencing. The maximum
sentence for aggravated assault is fourteen years while the maximum for
attempted aggravated assault is seven years. Nonetheless, Williams argued
at his sentencing appeal that the absence of proof of harm (once he became
aware of his status) should be considered a mitigating factor, even though
he admitted transmitting the virus to the complainant. It was the fact that
the complainant was HIV-positive that necessitated the attempt conviction
yet because of the timing problems, he was able to argue that he had not
harmed the complainant. 66 Although not mentioned in the Supreme Court
of Canada judgment, Williams was also convicted of two counts of the
completed crime of aggravated assault in separate proceedings relating to
two other complainants to whom he failed to disclose but did not infect. 67
The result in Williams appears counterintuitive when one considers that
criminal law generally punishes people whose conduct causes harm more
severely than those whose conduct does not. In fact, several cases cite the
fact that the virus was transmitted as an aggravating factor in sentencing.6
8
The Court's logic results in a further marginalization of potentially HIV-
positive women, denying them the right to be informed of the HIV status
of their sexual partners.
In the Newfoundland Court of Appeal, Wells C.J. (in dissent) had
taken the position that, unless it was shown that the complainant was HIV-
positive at the time the accused learned of his status, then he did create a
risk of endangering her life. Wells C.J. alluded to the fact that requiring
proof that an HIV-positive complainant was not infected at a particular
date puts a heavy, if not impossible, burden on the Crown.
[The Crown's] burden should not be expanded to require the Crown to
also do the impossible and prove, with certainty, that the complainant was
66. Williams (NFCA), supra note 63. The Court of Appeal imposed the sentence for the substituted
verdict of attempted aggravated assault while considering Williams' appeal from sentences imposed
for aggravated assault against two additional complainants.
67. R. v. Williams, 2004 NLCA 24, 184 C.C.C. (3d) 193, aff'g [2001] N.J. No. 169 (Nfld. S.C.
(T.D.)) (QL). The trial judge had imposed a sentence of three years imprisonment for one complainant
and four years for the other to be served consecutively. The Court of Appeal imposed an additional
three years for the attempted aggravated assault. Thus, Williams received a sentence of ten years
in total. Unlike the trial judge, the Court of Appeal refused to reduce the overall sentence below ten
years.
68. See e.g. Williams (Ian), supra note 56 and Walkem, supra note 56.
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not infected prior to November 15, 1991. In the present state of medical
science that can never be proven. Recognition of the uncertainty as to the
complainant's HIV status does not automatically constitute reasonable
doubt as to whether the appellant, on the basis of the standard set out
in Cuerrier, endangered the life of the complainant. That standard, it
should be remembered, is: exposing one's sexual partner to the risk of
HIV infection.69
In Williams, the Supreme Court of Canada did state that the accused could
have been convicted of simple assault or sexual assault. But is this right
according to the Court's own requirements? In order to negate consent
after Cuerrier, there has to be a significant risk of serious bodily harm. If
the complainant was already infected, or if there was a reasonable doubt
that she was, fraud cannot be established and therefore no level of assault
can be proven. 70
The problem in Williams comes primarily from the specific harm
requirement to negate consent in Cuerrier. However, the result in Williams
was not unavoidable. The Williams Court could have found that having
unprotected sexual intercourse when one is HIV-positive always endangers
one's partner, whether or not the partner is HIV-negative, recognizing
that endangerment does not require certainty of harm but rather a real
risk of harm. The Court in Williams raised but did not decide whether or
not a person who is already HIV-positive can be "endangered" by further
exposure to potentially different strains of HIV given that every time the
virus is transmitted there is a potential for mutation. Thus, for example, if
the new strain were a drug-resistant one, the complainant's life could be in
greater danger even though he or she was already HIV-positive.
Another possibility would be to have found that Williams' failure to
disclose his HIV-positive status was a continuing act or omission which
became criminal when he learned he was HIV-positive and continued not to
disclose his status. As in Fagan v. Commissioner ofPolice of Metropolis,7'
the argument would be that the mens rea would be superimposed on an
ongoing course of conduct and at the moment he learned of his status
and continued to have unprotected sex without disclosing that status, the
offence was complete.
69. Williams (NFCA), supra note 63 at para. 113.
70. In Deblois, supra note 56, the accused bad unprotected sex with the complainant and she
subsequently tested positive for HIV. The accused was convicted of attempted aggravated sexual
assault presumably because it was impossible for the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the complainant was not infected with the virus prior to her relationship with the accused.
71. [1969] 1 Q.B.D. 439, (1968), 52 Cr. App. R. 700; g. v. Cooper, [1993) 1 S.C.R. 146, [1993]
S.C.J. No. 8.
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Finally, the Court could have retreated from Cuerrier, holding instead
that endangerment is necessary for aggravated assault but not for simple
assault. This would allow for sexual assault cases to proceed even where it
could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant was
HIV-negative at the time of the sexual activity.
The accused's knowledge of his or her HIV status
In Williams, the Supreme Court suggested that if the accused had been
aware of a significant risk that he was HIV-positive, this knowledge might
have been adequate to trigger the disclosure requirement. In setting out the
importance of when Williams became aware of his HIV status, the Court
stated:
The most important date in this case is November 15, 1991. On that date,
the respondent learned that he was HIV-positive. I do not overlook the
possibility that prior to November 15, 1991 he might have anticipated
at least the risk of an HIV-positive outcome, perhaps by October 16,
1991 when he was called in for the test, but we have no satisfactory
proof of that. The critical date for the purpose of establishing fraud to
vitiate consent (Criminal Code, s. 265(3)(c)) is when the respondent
had sufficient awareness of his HIV-positive status that he can be said
to have acted 'intentionally or recklessly, with knowledge of the facts
constituting the offence, or with wilful blindness toward them' .72
Does the Court mean that, if there were adequate proof that Williams knew
of the risk that he had HIV, he would have had a legal duty to disclose
that risk to his sexual partners? What would be required to constitute a
sufficient risk in this context? What about an individual who knows or
suspects that one of his or her former partners is infected? How would such
a standard be applied to people in high risk groups such as sex workers or
IV drug users? Could it then be argued, for example, that all IV drug users
sharing needles must know that they are at high risk of HIV? What about
individuals who have recently arrived in Canada from a country with a
particularly high incidence of HIV infection?
72. Williams (SCC), supra note 38 at para. 27 [emphasis added; citations omitted]. The issue
of whether knowledge of a risk that one is HIV-positive is sufficient has been considered in- more
detail in England in the context of recklessly transmitting HIV. See e.g. Samantha Ryan, "Reckless
Transmission of HIV: Knowledge and Culpability" (2006) Crim. L. Rev. 981. Ryan argues against
criminalization where the accused is aware of a risk that he or she is HIV-positive but does not have
actual knowledge 'because this could place a discriminatory burden on persons in high-risk groups
such as gay men, IV drug users or those from sub-Saharan Africa. She also argues that the Crown
should be required to prove that the accused knew that HIV could be transmitted through the type of
sexual contact at issue in the case.
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The Ontario Court of Appeal has recently held, relying on Williams,
that wilful blindness with respect to one's HIV status is sufficient for
prosecution.73 In particularly disturbing circumstances, a father was
charged with sexual assault causing bodily harm for transmitting gonorrhea
to his five-year-old daughter. He was also charged with aggravated sexual
assault for possibly exposing his daughter to HIV. The accused refused
to be tested for HIV even though there was evidence that his long-term
partner, the girl's mother, was HIV-positive and that she had not had sex
with anyone but the accused for five years.
The Crown adduced some evidence from which a trier of fact could infer
that, in July 2001, the appellant was HIV-positive...[and] there is some
evidence from which a trier of fact could find that, by July 2001, the
appellant knew he was HIV-positive. His sexual partner had told him
that she was HIV-positive. In the face of that information, the appellant
deliberately refused to be tested to confirm his HIV status. The common
sense inference that the appellant knew he was HIV-positive follows the
same chain of reasoning that permits the court in a criminal context to
infer knowledge through wilful blindness. 74
In one English prosecution, Kouassi Adaye pled guilty to a charge of
recklessly inflicting grievous bodily harm even though he had never
received an HIV-positive diagnosis prior to his arrest.75 The evidence was
that he had been advised to take the test but had not done so. As will be
discussed below, this willingness to find wilful blindness may challenge
the assertion of those opposed to criminalization that criminalization will
deter testing. Individuals preferring to remain "unsure" of their status may
no longer be immune from prosecution.
The issue of whether actual knowledge should be required is a difficult
one. As we see from S.(F) discussed above, someone who commits a
sexual assault should not be allowed to avoid prosecution by refusing to
get tested, particularly where there is some evidence that the accused is
HIV-positive. At the same time, a determination of who closed their eyes
73. S.(F), supra note 56.
74. Ibid. at para. 18. The Court of Appeal went on to hold that, even though there was no scientific
evidence that HIV could be transmitted by the minimal penetration of the victim's vagina, the accused
clearly created a risk that transmission could occur and that this was sufficient to send him back to
trial on the charge of aggravated sexual assault. At the new trial the accused was convicted of sexual
assault causing bodily harm and sexual interference but was acquitted on the HIV related charge of
aggravated sexual assault. See also Sam Pazzano, "Despicable dad: HIV-positive man guilty of sex
with daughter, 5" Toronto Sun (14 October 2006) 5.
75. Catherine Dodds et al., "Grievous harm? Use of Offences Against the Person Act 1861 for sexual
transmission of HIV" Briefing Paper, (October 2005) at 26, online: Sigma Research <http://www.
sigmaresearch.org.uk/downloads/report05b.pdf>.
146 The Dalhousie Law Journal
to the knowledge that they could be HIV-positive could bring into play
potentially discriminating stereotypes about HIV and its likely carriers.
If wilful blindness is to be sufficient, we should maintain a rigorous
subjective standard and not turn wilful blindness into a defacto negligence
standard of who ought to have known their HIV status.7 6 We should also be
cautious about extending the mens rea to recklessness where the accused
could be aware of the possibility he or she was HIV-positive. Accepting a
recklessness standard could cast the net too wide particularly for persons
in high-risk groups.
Is there a duty to disclose where a condom is used?
The most significant question that remains unanswered after Cuerrier
and Williams is whether the use of a condom reduces the risk to such
an extent that non-disclosure no longer constitutes fraud. Any coherent
social or legal policy should attempt to minimize harm and encourage
responsible sexual behaviour. The use of condoms is still the best means,
short of abstinence, of minimizing the risk of transmission of HIV in
sexual activity. Cuerrier leaves unclear the important question of whether
an accused who wears a condom, but fails to disclose his status, should be
subjected to criminal liability. The majority suggested, without explicitly
deciding, that if an accused wore a condom, the risk of harm might not
be significant enough to establish fraud and thus that there might not be a
requirement to disclose:
To have intercourse with a person who is HIV-positive will always
present risks. Absolutely safe sex may be impossible. Yet the careful use
of condoms might be found to so reduce the risk of harm that it could
no longer be considered significant so that there might not be either
deprivation or a risk of deprivation."
McLachlin J., in her concurring minority judgment, explicitly stated that
her test for fraud negating consent would not include protected sex because
there needs to be a high risk or probability of transmitting the disease to
warrant criminalization.
Even with a condom there is a real, albeit small, risk of it failing. The
majority failed to address the issue of whether the HIV-positive partner
should be the one to decide whether that is a risk the complainant should
take. If a condom breaks and the virus is transmitted, are we going to tell
the complainant that the sexual activity did not present a significant risk
76. R. v. Malfara, 2006 CanLIl 17318 (Ont. C.A.) has recently affimed the subjective component to
wilful blindness.
77. Cuerrier supra note 19 at para. 129.
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of harm to her although it did transmit HIV? Nor did the majority explore
what "careful" use of condoms entails. At what moment does the duty
to disclose arise? If a condom breaks, does the potential accused need to
then quickly disclose his HIV-positive status? Does lawful sexual activity
suddenly become aggravated sexual assault if the condom falls off or is
not used effectively? Or is it enough to simply attempt to use a condom to
avoid criminal responsibility? Is there a line to be drawn between criminal
behaviour (non-disclosure in the context of unprotected sex) and deceitful,
but non-criminal, behaviour (non-disclosure in the context of protected
sex)?
In Edwards-a post-Cuerrier decisionT-the judge proceeded on the
assumption that the only issue was whether the sex with the complainant
was "unprotected," thus concluding that, had a condom been used, there
would have been no assault. The trial judge concluded that the Crown
had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the men engaged in
unprotected sex and hence failed to prove non-consent.79
With respect to whether non'disclosure in the context of protected
sex is criminal, Edwards held that this issue should be left to Parliament.
Similarly in Agnatuk-Mercier the judge noted that in order to convict the
accused "it must be established by the Crown beyond a reasonable doubt
that unprotected sex with him, took place." 0 The Court took a different
approach in R. v. Mabior,1 where McKelvey J. convicted the accused on
counts involving protected sex when the accused had a detectable viral
load. The accused was acquitted only on counts involving protected sex
where the evidence indicated that the accused had an undetectable viral
load. The trial judge found that condoms had a failure rate of 20% and that
this was sufficient to constitute a significant risk of serious bodily harm.
The appropriate charge
There is still a lack of clarity about the most appropriate charges. In
Williams, the Supreme Court of Canada did not disturb the conviction for
common nuisance but did not discuss the charge. We know that a charge
of aggravated assault or aggravated sexual assault will be made out where
the accused does not disclose his status and where the complainant was
78. Edwards, supra note 56.
79. Ibid. at para. 24.
80. Agnatuk-Mercier, supra note 56 at para. 7. In a New Zealand case, Police v. Dalley, [2005]
NZAR 682; 2005 NZAR LEXIS 9 [Dist. Ct. Wellington] the accused was charged with nuisance for
having unprotected oral sex and protected vaginal sex. He was acquitted on the basis that he had taken
reasonable steps to meet his duty of reasonable care.
81. 2008 MBQB 201.
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not HIV-positive at the time of the assault. Where there is a reasonable.
doubt about the complainant's status at the time of unprotected sexual
intercourse, attempted aggravated assault may be appropriate, although
the Supreme Court also (questionably) suggested that sexual assault would
have been an alternative.
It is not clear from these cases why some cases involve the charge of
aggravated assault while others involve the charge of aggravated sexual
assault for virtually the same conduct. Cuerrier itself involved aggravated
assault but there is nothing in the judgment to suggest that a charge of
aggravated sexual assault, a crime with a higher maximum sentence,
could not also have been made out. Aggravated sexual assault is one of the
designated offences prescribed under section 490.011 of the Code which
requires sex offender registration, whereas aggravated assault is not.82
Publication bans on the name of the complainant are also mandatory when
requested in the context of aggravated sexual assault83 but, in the context
of aggravated assault, the ban must be proven "necessary for the proper
administration of justice. 8 4 These reasons may influence some of the
charge-laying decisions but there are likely other factors contributing to
the selection of the charge.
II. Arguments for and against criminalization
A wise nation would consider whether in [prosecuting individuals who
put others at risk of contracting HIV] we advance the public health... If,
on the other hand, criminalisation serves to undermine our overall public
health response to the HIV epidemic, then we must seriously question
whether the gains from criminalisation are worth it. 5
Despite the uncertainties after Cuerrier and Williams, one fact is clear. The
Supreme Court of Canada has considered the wilful transmission of HIV
in three cases 86 and denied leave to appeal in a fourth case in which the
Newfoundland Court of Appeal had raised a sentence from thirty months
to over eleven years. In all three cases, the Court upheld convictions, albeit
in Williams, only for an attempt. Thus we have a clear indication from the
Court, without a single dissenting voice, that criminal law is an appropriate
82. Sex Offender Information Registration Act, S.C. 2004, c.10 [SOIRA]. Section 4 requires "sex
offenders" or persons subject to one or more orders under section 490.019 of the Code to register and
report regularly at a designated reporting centre. Under s. 3 of the SOIRA, a crime of a sexual nature
consists of one or more acts that are sexual in nature or committed with the intent to commit an act or
acts that are sexual in nature and constitute an offence.
83. See Code, s. 486.4
84. Code, s. 486.5.
85. Dalton, supra note 8 at 255.
86. Thornton, supra note 23; Cuerrier supra note 19; and Williams (SCC), supra note 38.
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tool to use in the most serious cases involving an accused who knows he
is HIV-positive but refuses to disclose that status to sexual partners. The
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada has given short shrift to the
various arguments against criminalization although some of the arguments
are briefly discussed by McLachlin J. in her minority judgment in Cuerrier.
It is to the arguments both for and against criminalization that the paper
now turns.
Although the prosecution of persons who fail to disclose their HIV-
positive status to their sexual partners is now entrenched in Canadian
criminal law, it is nonetheless helpful to return to the basic question of
whether criminalization is appropriate at all before considering the various
options for criminalization. These arguments have not yet been canvassed
fully either in our highest court or in Parliament and yet go to the heart of
why we punish people in the criminal justice system.
. The failure to disclose one's HIV-positive status can have a devastating
impact on one's sexual partners. There are references in the case law to
women having abortions 7 or attempting suicide8 because of their fear
of HIV. In every case, lives are thrown into turmoil. Even with a much-
improved prognosis if treatment is instituted early, there is still no cure
for HIV/AIDS and the treatments can be difficult to endure. For those for
whom the diagnosis is not made early on, there is still the prospect of full-
blown AIDS. The judicial and prosecutorial desire to recognize this harm
and punish the accused is understandable, particularly where the virus has
been transmitted.
Three arguments are used most frequently by the courts to justify
criminalization: incapacitating the accused, deterrence, and retribution and
denunciation. The language of rehabilitation, or concern for the accused's
welfare, is starkly absent in these cases. The primary purpose is to remove
the accused from society so that he will not be able to continue to engage in
unsafe sexual practices. Related to this purpose is the need to deter others
from engaging in similar conduct. Finally, the cases reflect the desire for
retribution and the need to denounce the wrong done to the complainants.
Denunciation recognizes the importance of law in setting normative
standards when it comes to sexual behaviour which endangers another
person. The arguments against criminalization, by contrast, usually relate
to the impact of criminalization on the population of persons with HIV,
such as their decision to get tested, and to the social stigma associated
87. Mercer, supra note 22.
88. See e.g. Miron, supra note 56, and Mercer, supra note 22.
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with HIV. There are also numerous practical difficulties in prosecuting
such offences.
1. Arguments supporting criminalization
a. Isolating the accused
The most immediate concern in these cases for prosecutors is to stop the
accused from engaging in unsafe sexual practices. In most of the cases
discussed in this paper, the accused failed to disclose his HIV-positive
status to more than one complainant. In Aziga, for example, in addition
to the two counts of murder, the accused has been charged with thirteen
counts of aggravated sexual assault relating to thirteen different women,
seven of whom he was alleged to have infected with HIV. In a majority of
cases, increasingly coercive public-health mechanisms, from counselling
to orders not to participate in sexual activity, had been exhausted and had
failed to change the behaviour of the accused. 89 These cases reflect the
sense of frustration on the part of prosecutors and courts. In Mercer, for
example, the Newfoundland Court of Appeal stated:
Individuals who have proven themselves capable of paying no heed
whatsoever to competent and authoritative medical instruction as to
the measures absolutely essential to the protection of others from HIV
infection represent a grave danger to society and they cannot be allowed
to circulate freely in it for fear that they will continue to knowingly infect
other unwitting partners with impunity.9"
Putting the accused in jail does isolate him from the community and most
opportunities for heterosexual sex, at least for the duration of the sentence.
However, judges tend to ignore the vulnerability of the prison population
given the high incidence of HIV and the prevalence of high-risk sexual
and drug-use practices in our penitentiaries.9 We may simply be shifting
the risk from one community to a more vulnerable (and less visible) one
89. See Cuerrier supra note 19; Williams (SCC), supra note 38; Mercer, supra note 22; and
Ssenyonga, supra note 22.
90. Mercer, supra note 22 at para. 78.
91. According to Correctional Service Canada's (CSC) 2004 statistics, HIV infection rates in inmates
are more than ten times higher (1.8%) than the general Canadian population (0.13%). Correctional
Seivice Canada, "A Health Care Needs Assessment of Federal Inmates in Canada" in Canadian
Journal of Public Health (March/April 2004) Supplement at $32-S33, online:
<http://www.cpha.ca/shared/cjph/archives/CPH_95_Suppl_1 e.pdf>.
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where individuals have even fewer resources available for protection from
HIV.92 As one writer states:
Rather than preventing an accused from engaging in further activity that
may transmit HIV, incarceration places that person in the milieu where it
is more, not less, likely that transmission will occur. Furthermore, prisons
are not hermetically sealed environments: inmates receive conjugal
visits from partners, and in most cases those serving prison sentences
will eventually be released into the community. It is dangerous to ignore
that risky activities within prisons may serve as a conduit for further
transmission outside prison populations. 91
Unless we plan to detain such individuals for life, it is not clear that
incarceration of the few will protect the health of the many.94 Long
sentences also raise the spectre of persons dying of AIDS in prison. Where
the accused himself has AIDS, even shorter penitentiary terms may be
de facto a life sentence. In the early cases, long sentences (and shorter
lifespans) masked the problem of what to do with such individuals when
they had served their full sentence. When HIV/AIDS was inevitably a
terminal illness, a sentence such as that in Mercer95 or Nduwayo96 made
it likely that the offender would not outlive his sentence. However,
with advances in treatment and the associated increased lifespan, the
92. Inmates in Canadian prisons do not have access to needle exchange programs and the safer
tattoo pilot project was cut in 2006 by the federal government. Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network,
"Stepping Up: Annual Report 2006-1007" (Toronto: Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, 2007) at 6,
online: Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network
<http://www.aidslaw.ca/publications/interfaces/downloadFile.php?ref- 1093>.
93. Elliott, Criminal Law and HIV/AIDS, supra note 26.
94. National Commission on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, "Report on HIV disease in
correctional facilities" (Washington D.C.: The Commission, 1991) at 36.
95. Supra note 22 at para. 105. The Court of Appeal imposed a sentence of eleven years and three
additional months for breach of his bail conditions.
96. Supra note 34. His twenty-five year sentence was reduced to fifteen years based on the totality
principle. The B.C. Court of Appeal has since ordered a new trial on the basis of errors in the trial
judge's charge relating to credibility. See P. v. Nduwayo, 2008 BCCA 255.
152 The Dalhousie Law Journal
question arises of how to deal with such individuals after their period of
imprisonment.
9 7
b. Deterrence
The majority in Cuerrier indicated that criminal law has a role to play
in deterring non-disclosure and in protecting the public from "irresponsible
individuals who refuse to comply with public-health orders to abstain from
high risk activities. ' 98 The language of general deterrence, blended with
retribution, drove the Supreme Court of Canada majority in Cuerrier:
* [Criminal law] provides a needed measure of protection in the form
of deterrence and reflects society's abhorrence of the self-centered
recklessness and the callous insensitivity of the actions of the respondent
and those who have acted in a similar manner. The risk of infection and
death of partners of HIV-positive individuals is a cruel and ever present
reality. Indeed the potentially fatal consequences are far more invidious
and graver than many other actions prohibited by the Criminal Code.
The risks of infection are so devastating that there is a real and urgent
need to provide a measure of protection for those in the position of the
complainants. If ever there was a place for the deterrence provided by
criminal sanctions it is present in these circumstances."
The harsh approach taken to effect general deterrence is heightened by
the courts' dread and fear of HIV. In Mercer, the Newfoundland Court of
Appeal referred to the accused's crimes as "catastrophic and dreadful"' 0
and of "monumental proportions."10' In raising the sentence of thirty months
imposed by the trial judge to eleven years, the Court acknowledged that
eleven years was tantamount to life imprisonment for the accused given
his medical status, but the Court wanted to send a message that individuals
may risk imprisonment that exceeds their life expectancy if their actions
97. See Christopher Park, "Empowering people living with HIV in Europe: manifesto, mantra or
mirage?" in Srdan Matic, Jeffrey E. Lazarus & Martin C. Donoghoe, eds., HIV/AIDS in Europe:
Moving from Death Sentence to Chronic Disease Management (Copenhagen: World Health
Organization, 2006) at 15-26.
In the recent case of Carl Leone, the Crown has made an application to have the accused designated as
a dangerous offender and thus subject to indeterminate incarceration. Don Lajoie, "Crown questions
Leone assessment" Windsor Star (14 February 2008), online: Canada.com. Leone received fifteen
consecutive sentences totaling forty-nine years but was not found to be a dangerous offender. His
sentence was reduced to eighteen years on the basis of the principle of totality. The judge cited the fact
that Leone had pleaded guilty to spare his victims the trauma of testifying. See Caroline Alphonso,
"Man Gets 18 Years for Spreading HIV" Globe and Mail (5 April 2008) A6.
<http://www.canada.com/windsorstar/story.html?id= e5f5fffe-e3Oc-480a-8dd9-
bbb6ac816308&k=75 134>. See also Schmidt, supra note 56.
98. Supra note 19 at para. 141.
99. Ibid. at para. 142.
100. Supra note 22 at para. 52.
101. Ibid. at para. 85.
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"wreak a life sentence upon their unwitting partners."' 2 The Court wanted
to ensure that the accused was never in a position to repeat his conduct.
Whether this tone will diminish now that HIV/AIDS is no longer
inevitably fatal remains to be seen.0 3 The sentences imposed in more
recent cases suggest that developments in treatment have not tempered
the harsh judicial response, and the apparent increase in the number and
seriousness of charges laid suggests that prosecutors continue to take these
cases very seriously."°
The argument for deterrence is premised on the assumption that the
fear of prosecution will lead individuals to disclose their HIV status to their
sexual partners who.will in turn insist on safer sex or withhold consent.
But, is this a legitimate assumption? The fact that medical and educational
efforts and even coercive public-health mechanisms have failed to alter
the behaviour of the accused in these cases might lead one to suspect
that the small likelihood of criminal prosecution would be insufficient to
alter the behaviour in question. The incidence of sexual assault generally,
despite its much clearer and more widely known criminalization, brings
the criminal law's ability to regulate sexual activity through deterrence
into question.
[Statements supporting deterrence] contain the assumption that people
living with HIV will have a clear and detailed understanding of the
precise ways in which such convictions are obtained (i.e. what constitutes
liable activity and what does not). It also presumes that people living
with HIV will prioritise concerns about legal liability ahead of sexual
impulse, privacy, and a desire to not be defined by, or discriminated
against because of their HIV infection.° 5
The very premise underlying the deterrence argument is suspect,
particularly in the sexual context. As Professor Dalton states:
The notion that we can deter Paul from engaging in risky sex by punishing
Peter assumes a great deal that may not be true. It assumes that Paul
engages in a rational risk calculation; that he is future oriented; that he
will focus on what happens to Peter; that he has come to grips with his
HIV status and the fact that he might pose a transmission risk to others;
and that he is fully accepted the fact that for the rest of his life he will
102. Ibid. at para. 103.
103. Stobbe, supra note 15. This article states that an American diagnosed with HIV/AIDS can
expect to live an average of twenty-four years after diagnosis with the health expenditure of about
$600,000 US.
104. One could speculate that the growing awareness that HIV is not necessarily fatal has increased
the rate of non-disclosure. In other words, the vigilance we saw regarding safer sex in the 1980s-90s
may be slipping and disclosure seen as less necessary.
105. Dodds et al., supra note 75 at 9.
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face more than occasional rejection by potential sex partners. 116
Of course similar concerns could be raised about deterrence in the sexual
assault context generally. My.point here is simply that criminalization
is unlikely to serve a widespread deterrent function when dealing with
sexual activity. A recent American empirical study, for example, found
that persons at high risk for HIV (both those who had been tested and
those who had not) did not alter their sexual practices (i.e., disclosure
and the use of condoms) based on whether they believed the law required
disclosure. 07
c. Retribution, denunciation, and the symbolic function of law
I suggest that much of the judicial concern with deterrence discussed above
masks the underlying desire for retribution. There is a clear message in the
case law that the devastation caused to the complainants must be publicly
acknowledged and denounced through a harsh punitive response to the
accused. This is strongly expressed in Miron:
It is clear and it [sic] acknowledged that [the accused's] actions have
had a devastating and emotional damage to these victims, one that.can
probably never be measured. One can only imagine how unspeakable the
horror must be for these individuals upon leaming of Mr. M.'s disease.
They may very well be left wondering whether or not they have all been
sentenced to death and as Mr. M. himself described when he said that he
was the judge, jury and executioner. 108
The urge to punish or seek retribution is evident in the cases. There is
a sense that the nature and seriousness of the risks involved demand a
response from the system even if that response is not going to contribute
to the public health fight against the illness. There is an unarticulated
undercurrent in the case law that the accused involved are bad people from
whom potential complainants must be protected, and not people who, in
difficult circumstances themselves, made very bad choices.
The desire for retribution overshadows the complexity of the
relationships involved in these cases, portraying the accused as an evil
predator and (usually) the complainant as the innocent prey. Many authors
have identified the tendency to divide those who acquire HIV/ADS into
two groups. On the one hand, there is the recipient or victim who acquires
the virus unknowingly and "innocently" while, on the other hand, there
are those who are complicit in their own demise. The "innocent" include
106. Supra note 8 at 252.
107. Burris et al., supra note 18.
108. Supra note 56 at para. 22.
The Boundaries of the Criminal Law: the 155
Criminalization of the Non-disclosure of HIV
those who have contracted the virus from a blood transfusion, perinatally
or from a long-term heterosexual relationship. IV drug users, same-sex
partners and sometimes those who contracted the virus from "casual"
heterosexual activity are in the blameworthy group. Similarly, there is a
tendency to create distinct categories of those who transmit the virus and
those who acquire it. As stated by American author Thomas Shevory:
Although AIDS has generated a plurality of discourses and responses, in
the "mainstream" it is still too often reduced to a simple morality play in
which "innocents" and "victims" are continuously threatened by moral
reprobates and evil pleasure seekers. °0
Someone who has led a lifestyle of which the court disapproves is more
likely to be treated harshly. In Wentzell, "0 for example, the Court treated as
an aggravating factor in sentencing the fact that "the offender has led a very
promiscuous sexual life both of the heterosexual and homosexual nature
before meeting the complainant. Some of this was professional sex."''
This lifestyle tells one nothing useful about the accused's blameworthiness
for the incidents on which the charges were based.
The concept of blame is not unique to the accused. Complainants also
run the risk of blame in the sexual transmission cases. For example, the
Ontario Criminal Injuries Compensation Board reduced by forty percent
the award for three complainants who had been infected by the same
accused because the Board concluded that a reasonable person would not
have had unprotected sex with the accused until knowing him for a longer
period.
The Board does not consider it reasonable to a trust one's life to an almost
complete stranger on such a brief acquaintance. Given the dangers of
unprotected sexual activities a reasonable person would require a much
longer period of trust building. Furthermore the Board does not consider
it sufficient to simply ask the sexual partner for an HIV status. One does
not need the protection of such a question against an honest person and
the question does not protect against a dishonest person."2
109. Supra note 44 at 11.
110. Supra note 22 at paras. 7, 25.
11l. Ibid. at para. 7.
112. CriminalInjuries Compensation Board, supra note 27 at para. 71. This is disturbingly reminiscent
of the view expressed in sexual assault cases that "loose women ask for it." It is also not reflected
by the facts. The Board failed to acknowledge that some of the complainants thought they were in
relatively permanent stable relationships with the accused.
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The Ontario Divisional Court overturned the reduction, noting that
"the conduct of.the accused was so outrageous that any lack of prudence
on the part of the victims pales into oblivion.""' 3
If we have learned anything over the past two decades with HIV/AIDS,
it is that there is no "us" and "them." We cannot divide people into those
who transmit the virus and those who acquire it because we are all potential
transmitters and potential recipients. Even the most blameworthy accused
has acquired the virus, quite possibly him or herself a "victim" of failure
to disclose."4 Recent studies have established that HIV is most likeiy to
be transmitted during the period in which the individual does not know
yet that he or she is HIV-positive, a fact which raises huge challenges for
prevention strategies." 5
Closely related to retribution is the idea that criminal law can serve
a symbolic function in reflecting societal values. In other words, the
criminalization of non-disclosure reflects society's values about appropriate
sexual behaviour. Thus, it could be argued that even if criminal law does
not contribute to curbing the spread of HIV/AIDS, it is still legitimate as a
normative mechanism for representing shared social values.
2. Arguments against criminalization
a. The impact of criminalization on behaviour
Many of the arguments against criminalizing the non-disclosure of HIV
status by persons with HIV focus on the impact of criminalization on the
behaviour of persons with or at risk for HIV. One of the central arguments
is that the potential for criminal prosecution will drive people underground
and deter them from getting tested (and properly treated) for HIV Because
criminal liability only attaches if the accused knew that he or she was
infected with the virus, persons who do not know their HIV status cannot
be prosecuted criminally. Therefore, it is argued, people will go untested,
thus increasing the risk both to themselves and to their sexual partners.
113. Ibid. at para. 73.
114. In fact, the complainant in Williams (SCC), supra note 38, was herself later charged with
aggravated sexual assault due to her failure to disclose her HIV status to two male complainants,
neither of whom contracted HIV. She received a conditional sentence of twelve months, and three
years probation. She was diagnosed "as suffering from Mood Disorder due to HIV Infection with
Hypomanic Features, at the time of the offence" (Murphy, supra note 56, at para. 16). Before pleading
guilty, Murphy spoke of having nothing but "hatred" for Williams, the man who had infected her,
describing him as "ruthless." (Sonia Verma, "Jennifer Murphy describes her life" Toronto Star (16
April 2005) A 10).
115. Lisa Priest, "Newly Infected Spread Half of H1V: McGill study finds high-risk people often don't
know they have virus" The Globe and Mail (2 March 2007), online: Globeandmail.com <http://www.
theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM..20070302.wxhivO2/BNStory/speciaiScienceandHealth/
home>.
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This position is expressed in the intervener factum in Cuerrier submitted
by various AIDS groups:
[A] policy of mandatory disclosure will dissuade at least some of those
at greatest risk of HIV infection from being tested so that they can
honestly say that they do not know their HIV status and to protect the
confidentiality of this information." 6
As with deterrence generally this assertion is very difficult to prove or
negate. Certainly in the early days of HIV/AIDS, there was little incentive
to be tested given the paucity of treatment options available and the stigma
associated with infection. Now that drug combinations can significantly
extend and improve the quality of life for people with HIV/AIDS, the
incentive for testing is greater. There is a myriad of factors that play into
the decision to be tested. Three of the primary reasons are the need to
know one's status in order to seek treatment for oneself; the need to know
one's status in order to modify one's sexual behaviour with others; and
the concern by a pregnant woman for the health of her fetus. Presumably
only those who are planning not to seek treatment and not to disclose their
HIV status would be deterred from getting tested. Those who plan to
act responsibly with regard to disclosure would have no reason to avoid
testing. Furthermore, a conscious decision not to get tested, because of
the fear of the results of testing, could be taken as wilful blindness with
respect to whether one is HIV-positive. I7
The majority of the Court in Cuerrier rejected out of hand the
suggestion that criminalization may deter people from getting tested by the
criminalization of non-disclosure. It assumed that everybody would want
to know whether or not they are infected and whether or not treatment is
available even though treatment is not a cure. McLachlin J., by contrast, did
briefly acknowledge the possibility of an impact on testing; however she
also suggested that criminalization could'actually encourage disclosure."8I
The Mercer Court also rejected the argument that imprisoning people
with HIV who fail to disclose their status would deter people from getting
tested. Neither Court cited any literature to back up its position.
My view is that we should be cautious about relying on deterrence either
to support or oppose criminalization. On the one hand, criminalization is
116. Cuerrier, supra note 19 (Factum of the Interveners, Canadian AIDS Society, Persons with AIDS
Society of British Columbia and Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network at para. 28).
117. S.(E), supra note 56 at para. 21.
118. McLachlin J. noted that Mercer (supra note 22) already established the offence of criminal
negligence causing bodily harm (where the virus is transmitted) and that there was no evidence that
this had decreased the rate of testing. Cuerrier, supra note 19 at para. 74.
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unlikely to deter large numbers of people from failing to disclose. On the
other hand, it is unlikely that criminalization deters significant numbers
of persons from getting tested for HIV, particularly when prosecutions are
still.relatively rare.119
b. Responsibility for avoiding HIV
Another argument against criminalization is that everyone should be
responsible for taking precautions against HIV, such as through condom
use. Criminalizing non-disclosure on the part of HIV-positive individuals
sends the wrong message because it reinforces the idea that the HIV-
positive partner has the sole responsibility for practising safer sex and
creates a false sense of security among potential complainants. 120
The majority judgment in Cuerrier gave short shrift to the argument
that criminalization could interfere with the public-health message that
everyone needs to take precautions against HIV. The Court held that
those who know they are HIV-positive do bear the greater responsibility
for practising safer sex: "that responsibility cannot be lightly shifted to
unknowing members of society who are wooed, pursued and encouraged
by infected individuals to become their sexual partner."''
The argument that people would become complacent and develop
a false sense of security on the basis that they are being protected by the
criminal law is not convincing.122 Criminal law operates primarily after an
illegal act has been committed. The fact that sexual assault, for example,
is a crime does not lead women to feel they are somehow protected from
it. However, the argument that everyone is responsible for practising safer
sex cannot be so easily dismissed.
There is no doubt that, in an ideal world, everyone would be able to
insist on condom use and take responsibility for his or her own protection.
119. Given that criminalization does not appear to have a significant impact on people's sexual
practices one might suspect that it is unlikely to have a significant impact on testing decisions. This
fact is conceded in a recent empirical paper that opposes criminalization:
[H]ow plausible is it that people who do not let the prospect of criminal liability influence
their sexual behavior would be affected by criminal law in their health-seeking behavior?
There is little in the data ofh why people delay or avoid testing that suggests that fear of
criminal or other legal consequences is a major factor. ... [T]his is not to say that law may
not be a small factor for many, and even a decisive factor for a few, but the decision to test
seems to have other, more immediate drivers that probably swamp any effect on law in
most instances. (Burris et al., supra note 18 at 512-13.).
120. Cuerrier, supra note 19 (Factum of the Intervener, the British Columbia Civil Liberties
Association, at para. 28.) In Wentzell, supra note 22 at para. 13, two doctors testified in opposition to
criminalization for precisely this reason.
121. Cuerrier supra note 19 at para. 144.
122. A recent study found no evidence to indicate that the existence of HIV laws leads people to
assume they are safe. Burris et al., supra note 18 at 511-12.
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However, given the pervasive inequality, especially in heterosexual
relationships, is this a realistic expectation? Globally, more than fifty
percent of all HIV/AIDS cases are women. While the rate of infection for
women in North America has not yet reached that of men, the incidence in
young women is increasing faster than in any other group. The majority of
these women have been infected through heterosexual sex. This fact raises
many issues unique to women because of their relative powerlessness in
their sexual lives compared to men. Women may not be in a position to
insist on condom use. Women in abusive relationships, women involved
in prostitution, young women, and women living in poverty and/or social
isolation may all have particular difficulties in insisting on condom use.
Loppie and Gahagan assert that women in Canada as elsewhere "have
been relegated to positions of social, political and economic subordination
that are mediated by race and class" and that this subordination "inhibits
women's capacity to protect themselves from exposure to HIV.'1 23 Thus,
the reality for women may be that they cannot always take the best
precautions available to prevent transmission of HIV/AIDS; rather they
must rely on their male partners to cooperate.
The role of gendered imbalances of power in heterosexual sexual
relationships and how that relates to HIV/AIDS is a complex one. We
know that women are at a greater risk of acquiring HIV from vaginal
intercourse with an infected man than men are from vaginal intercourse
with an infected woman because of the higher concentration of HIV in
sperm and the increased surface area of the vagina. 124 We also know
that women are more likely to be subjected to violence from their sexual
partners. 25 Violent or forced sex in turn is more likely to transmit the
virus.126 Furthermore, the very fact of being HIV-positive can put a woman
at particular risk of violence:
Women living with HIV face some unique challenges connected to HIV
and sexual violence, particularly those who are in an abusive relationship.
123. Charlotte Loppie & Jacqueline Gahagan, "Stacked against us: HIV/AIDS statistics and women"
(2001) 21 Can. Woman Studies 6 at 6, cited in Joanne Csete, "Vectors, Vessels and Victims: HIV/
AIDS and Women's Human Rights in Canada" (Toronto: Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, 2005)
at 29, online: Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network
<http://www.aidslaw.ca/publications/interfaces/downloadFile.php?ref=529>.
124. Csete, ibid. at 14. See also Health Canada, "HIV/AIDS EPI Updates" (Ottawa: Health Canada,
April 2003) at 18-20, online: Health Canada <http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/publicat/epiu-aepi/hiv-vih/
pdf/epiact 0403 e.pdf>.
125. Michelle Teti et al., "The Links between Violence against Women and HIV/AIDS: Ecosocial and
Human Rights Frameworks Offer Insight into US Prevention Policies" (2006) 9 Health and Human
Rights 41.
126. Csete, supra note 123.
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Disclosure of a woman's HIV status to her partner can increase her
susceptibility to sexual and physical violence. Knowledge of her
HIV status can give her abuser further control in the relationship. For
example, her abuser may use her H1V status against her by threatening
to tell others. HIV-positive women may stay in abusive relationships
because of decreased self-worth and because they believe that no other
person would want to have a relationship with them.'27
Women also bear the added burden of the risk that the virus will be passed
on to their children through childbirth or breast-feeding. The assertion that
everyone should insist on careful condom use is based on a construction of
heterosexual relationships as involving two equal participants with equal
power to assert in the context of sexual activity. This view of equality
in sexual relationships is expressed in the following passage by Matthew
Weait who argues forcefully against criminalization:
If a person agrees to participate in the kind of sex which carries the risk
of HIV infection (and most sex is safer rather than safe) and is infected,
we must question whether it is right to attribute sole responsibility to
and punish the person who transmits the virus, when that would not
have happened but for the other person's willingness to accept that risk.
We must question the extent to which.they are passive in the process of
transmission and the extent to which they ought to be characterized as
innocent victims. We must question whether it is always, irrespective of
context, right to assert that it is something which is done to them.'28
Weait suggests that a woman's willingness to trust her sexual partner or her
failure to insist on precautions is as causally responsible for transmission
as the failure to disclose.'29 However, I would argue that the pervasive sex
inequality that exists in heterosexual relationships in particular renders
Weait's position unrealistic.
c. Stigma
Persons with HIV/AIDS face discrimination in a variety of contexts such
as housing, employment, and access to services. The fact that the rate of
HIV infection is higher among several social groups who already face
discrimination compounds the disadvantage experienced by persons
127. Voices of Positive Women, "FYI: Voices of Positive Women Newsletter" (Toronto: Voices of
Positive Women, August 2004) at 2, online: Voices of Positive Women
<http://www.vopw.org/voicesweb/aug04_fyi.pdf >.
128. "Taking the Blame: Criminal Law, Social Responsibility and the Sexual Transmission of HIV"
(2001) 23 J. Soc. Welfare & Fam. L. 441 at 451.
129. Ibid.
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with HIV. 13 0 In the early days of HIV, concerns were expressed that
criminal prosecutions would disproportionately affect persons in high-risk
populations, such as the gay community, who have already borne the brunt
of the social stigmatization of HIV. It is thus worthy of note that a large
majority of prosecutions in Canada to date have involved heterosexual
transmission, primarily from men to women. On the one hand, the small
number of same-sex prosecutions makes it appear that homosexual men are
not being targeted for criminalization. On the other hand, it could be argued
that the fact that prosecutions are more likely in the heterosexual context
reflects a lack of concern about potential homosexual complainants. 3 '
The rarity of gay complainants could reflect a lack of concern about
their physical integrity and stereotypes about their promiscuity and their
assumption of risk. One could speculate that who is charged with these
crimes is as much about the characteristics of the complainants as it is
about the accused. This trend has been noted in other countries as well:
There is also a generalized hierarchy of injured parties implied in these
cases: while all victims are consistently constructed as having been
victimized, not all complainants are in fact victims. Subtle distinctions
are made about the credibility and the importance of the particular
complainant. From the standpoint of the prosecution's goal of conviction,
witnesses have different value in bringing home the absolute villainy of
the accused. For example a woman who makes a single transgression
with an infected sexual partner becomes a more credible witness because
she validates the idea that the AIDS criminal alone is committing the
crime of infection.
... Drug injectors are not considered credible in a court of law. By virtue
of their addiction, they are thought to have lost their selves and therefore
their citizenship. Sex workers are already too criminal themselves to
sustain their position as an innocent party to a crime. Thus, it is no
accident that most cases that are prosecuted possess strikingly similar
characteristics. "I
Race also appears to play a role in these prosecutions. While both
the American and the Canadian cases seem to indicate a high number of
130. According to the Public Health Agency of Canada, an "estimated 51% of all infections at the end
of 2005 were attributed to men who have sex with men (MSM), 17% to IV drug users (IDUs), 27%
to heterosexuals, 4% to MSM/IDUs and the remaining to other exposures categories." Public Health
Agency of Canada, "Populations at Risk" (2005) Online: Public Health Agency of Canada <http://
www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/aids-sida/populations-e.html>.
131. Mark D. Fefer, "HIV: Criminal Intent" Seattle Weekly (I December 2004), online: Seattle Weekly
<http://www.seattleweekly.com/2004-12-0I/news/hiv-criminal-intent.php>.
132. Heather Worth, Cindy Patton & Diane Goldstein, "Introduction to Special Issue Reckless Vectors:
the Infecting "Other" in HIV/AIDS Law" (2005) 2 Sex. Research & Soc. Pol'y: J. of N.S.R.C. 3 at 7.
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accused men of African descent being charged, it is impossible to confirm
this impression with the limited information available. In Ssenyonga the
accused was black and all the complainants were white. The only case in
which murder charges have been laid in Canada also involves an African
accused and Caucasian victims. Perhaps the most well-known Canadian
accused, former Saskatchewan football player Trevis Smith, was also
black. In a New York case that attracted huge media interest, a young
Afro-American man, Nushawn Williams, was prosecuted after infecting
a number of white women. As one columnist put it when discussing the
Nushawn Williams case: "In the story of Williams, pop culture's holy
Trinity of sex, race, and danger was perfectly realized." '133
Similarly, in Seattle, Anthony Whitfield, an Afro-American, was
convicted of seventeen counts of first-degree assault (which requires
"intent to inflict great bodily harm") and was sentenced to 178 years in
prison for failing to disclose to his sexual partners that he was HIV-positive.
The majority of complainants in Whioeld were Caucasian women. 34 A
Seattle newspaper article links the focus on heterosexual sexual activity
with race arguing that heterosexual transmission, at least in the United
States, is more common than same-sex transmission in the Afro-American
population.'35
It is difficult to know whether race is a determinative factor in laying
charges or whether there is some other variable connected to race. At
least one English study has suggested that non-disclosure of one's HIV
status may be more common among persons of African descent. 3 6
What is the impact of criminalization on the already significant stigma
borne by persons with HIV? On the one hand, it could be argued that
it is necessary to punish small numbers of persons who demonstrate a
pattern of reckless conduct regarding transmission of the virus in order
133. JoAnn Wypijewski, "The Secret Sharer: Sex, Race, and Denial in an American Small-Town"
(July 1998) 297:1778 Harper's Magazine 35.
134. Washington v. Whioield (16 May 2006), 32655-8-I1 (App. 2d. Div.) online: FindLaw <http://
caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court-wa&vol=2006_app/326558MAJ&invol--4>. See
also Kai Wright, "Barely Legal" (July 2006) Paz Magazine online: Poz: Health, Life & HIV <http://
www.poz.com/articles/1056_7014.shtml>; Fefer, supra note 131.
135. Fefer, supra note 131. It is difficult to generalize about race from the U.S. cases because of the
high rate of imprisonment of Afro-American men and the high rate of HIV transmission in prisons
there.
136. Jonathan Elford et al. "Disclosing your HIV Status: The Role of an Ethnicity among People
Living with HIV in London" (Paper presented to the XVIth International AIDS Conference in Toronto,
Canada, 14 August 2006) online: International AIDS Society
<http://www.aids2006.org/pag/Abstracts.aspx?AID=9498>. In the Canadian context, we know that
the rate of H1V/AIDS is higher in Aboriginal communities. It would also be useful to know whether
Aboriginal Canadians are more likely to be targeted for prosecution. The cases examined in this study
did not appear to support this possibility.
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to distinguish them from the large. majority of individuals with HIV who
are responsible in sexual activity. In other words, if we do not punish the
few who are irresponsible, we taint the many who are not. As Winifred
Holland states:
If we do not use the criminal law then there will be public outrage at high-
profile cases like Ssenyonga where individuals have recklessly infected
others. Such outrage will be aimed indiscriminately at all individuals
who are HIV infected. We need an outlet for expression of outrage at
such willful or reckless behavior.'37
On the other hand it could be argued that criminalization unduly stigmatizes
all persons with HIV/AIDS as being potential criminals, painting them as
irresponsible and dangerous, as vectors of disease, and as a population that
must be identified and removed from society.
Criminalization of some HIV-infected persons alters the relationship
we have to all H1V-positive people because they are viewed, simply by
virtue of their HIV-infected status, as criminals-in-waiting. One slipup,
in the heat of the moment, and they will then be found guilty of an AIDS-
related crime."'
In this regard, it is interesting that most HIV/AIDS groups firmly oppose
criminalization except where the accused deliberately set out to transmit
the virus. In a recent English study, for example, the authors interviewed
groups of persons who had been diagnosed as being HIV-positive to
determine their views on the criminalization of HIV transmission. The
majority of statements made (ninety percent) were opposed to the trend
towards criminalization. Concerns were raised that prosecutions minimize
the importance of shared responsibility for safer sex and increase the
stigma experienced by persons with HIV. 9
Another troubling question is why there are cases involving the
criminal transmission of HIV and not other illnesses. For example,
during the SARS outbreak, there was no discussion of criminalizing
people who may not have acted responsibly in following public-health
directions. In the summer of 2007, there was a lot of attention given to
a man who got on an international airline flight while suffering from a
virulent form of tuberculosis.'" There was no serious discussion of
137. "HIV/AIDS and the Criminal Law" (1994) 36 Crim. L.Q. 279 at 288.
138. Worth, Patton & Goldstein, supra note 132 at 9.
139. Catherine Dodds & T. Keogh, "Criminal Prosecutions for HIV Transmission: People Living with
HIV Respond" (2006) 17 Int'l J. of STD & AIDS 315 at 315.
140. See generally John Lauerman, "TB case shows safety gap" Edmonton Journal (8 June 2007)
A19; Tu Thanh Ha "Fellow Travellers Sue TB carrier" Globe and Mail (13 July 2007) A7.
164 The Dalhousie Law Journal
charging him criminally even though the risk he created was probably
greater than one act of unprotected sex by a person who is HIV-positive.
We must question what it is about HIV/AIDS that warrants its exceptional
treatment.' 41 Is it because it is about sex? Is it because HIV/AIDS started
in and is still associated with the gay community and IV drug users despite
its proliferation in the heterosexual community? The "uniqueness" of HIV
among communicable diseases generally is troubling and indicates that,
for the preservation of social justice, the state must take great care in using
the criminal law to regulate HIV/AIDS transmission.
d. Practical difficulties in prosecuting non-disclosure cases
.As has been mentioned above, there are numerous hurdles in prosecuting
one of these cases including issues relating to causation and the need for
sexual history evidence. There are other practical difficulties. In several of
the cases, for example, the accused had died either before trial' 42 or before
the verdict was delivered. 43 This difficulty will arise less frequently now
that recent developments in drug combinations have extended the lifespan
for many people suffering from HIV/AIDS.' 44 Any trials where no guilty
plea is forthcoming require a huge investment of time and money on the
part of the Crown, and energy and distress on the part of the complainant.Another serious problem with such prosecutions relates to the
confidentiality of medical and counselling records. Counselling records
may be the only way to prove that the accused was aware of the risks
of unprotected sex. We have already seen in the sexual assault context
generally the difficulty created by accused persons seeking the counselling
records of complainants. We will now have to face Crown counsel seeking
access to medical and counselling records of potential accused persons
and arguments about the chilling effect this will have on people seeking
counselling and, correspondingly, on contact tracing.
The access to records issue is particularly problematic in the context
of HIV/AIDS because counselling is where people can discuss their
difficulties with disclosure and receive counselling on safer sex practices.
If the potential future disclosure of confidential material damages the
relationship of trust, we all lose. Likewise, if the complainant is HIV-
positive, the necessity for sexual history evidence (which may include
141. For a discussion of treating HI V/AIDS as an exceptional condition see Mary Anne Bobinski,
"HIV/AIDS and Public Health Law" in Tracey Bailey, Timothy Caulfield & Nola M. Ries, eds., Public
Health Law & Policy in Canada (Markham: Butterworths, 2005) 165 at 174-75, 212-13.
142. See Bonar, supra note 23.
143. Ssenyonga, supra note 22.
144. See e.g. Stobbe, supra note 15.
The Boundaries of the Criminal Law: the 165
Criminalization of the Non-disclosure of HIV
counselling records relating to her and her previous sexual partners) has
the potential for abuse and may well discourage women from agreeing to
testify in such prosecutions.
Ssenyonga, albeit a pre-Cuerrier case, demonstrates a number of
the problems involved in HIV/AIDS prosecutions. The accused was an
immigrant from Africa and was charged with three counts of criminal
negligence causing bodily harm, aggravated sexual assault, common
nuisance, and the administration of a noxious substance. Through various
stages of the trial, the judge dismissed all but the criminal negligence
charges. The trial was long, complex, and costly. Of the numerous
women Ssenyonga may have put at risk, including at least ten of whom
were allegedly infected, only three were willing to testify against him.
Their primary concern, according to one author, was that their identities
could be revealed publicly, particularly if the sexual assault charges were
rejected by the trial judge. Several of them had not disclosed their HIV
status to their families. 145 The prosecution also had to ensure that every
sexual partner of each of the complainants was interviewed and tested
negative for HIV. Because Ssenyonga had developed AIDS by the time of
trial, there were repeated interruptions in the trial for him to seek medical
treatment and, ultimately, he died only days before the verdict was to be
rendered. Thus a multimillion-dollar prosecution and a significant trauma
for the complainants did not reach a conclusion.
3. Setting limits on the scope of criminalization
There are numerous difficult boundary issues that challenge our ability to
set rational limits on criminalization. Those relating to condom use and,
more specifically, condom failure have been addressed elsewhere. How
far will the disclosure obligation extend? What if the accused's viral load
is so low that the virus is almost undetectable, thus decreasing the risk of
transmission?. Is that risk of harm significant enough to negate consent? 146
Or, is any risk of HIV transmission such a serious risk that it can still
145. Callwood, supra note 47. The sexual assault charges were thrown out on the basis that the
complainants consented to the sexual activity but the trial judge agreed to maintain the publication ban
on the complainants' names.
146. See R. v. McKenzie, as described by Lajoie, supra note 56, where the trial judge rejected this
defence but acquitted the accused for other reasons. He stated "it seems to be a fragile defence. All
it reveals is the state of the blood tested on the day in question, not two weeks earlier, not two weeks
later.... To rely on slips of paper from a lab seems fraught with hazard." See more recently, Mabior,
supra note 81, where the trial judge did consider the accused's undetectable viral load but only where
the accused was wearing a condom. The trial judge held that the use of a condom along with an
undetectable viral load negated the Crown's allegation of fraud. However, where the accused did not
wear a condom, a low or undetectable viral load was not sufficient to negate fraud.
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negate consent? What if the accused does not know what his viral count
is?
As we have seen in the sexual assault context, the involvement of
alcohol will inevitably complicate matters. What if the accused was too
intoxicated to understand the need for disclosure to the complainant?
Sexual assault is a general intent offence suggesting that only extreme
intoxication could negate the fault requirement. However, section 33.1
of the Criminal Code limits the defence of extreme intoxication in the
context of crimes that interfere with or threaten to interfere with the bodily
integrity of another person.
To what extent does the accused have to ensure that the complainant
understands the information being disclosed? What if the accused does
disclose his status but the complainant is too intoxicated to understand?
What if the complainant has a mental disability which precludes her from
understanding the risks of HIV involved in unprotected sex even though
she may be capable of consenting to sex generally? 47
Similarly, issues may arise regarding an accused's mental state. What
if the accused suffers from AIDS-related dementia or is drug-addicted?
One problem that has arisen in several jurisdictions is what to do with the
individual who has a pre-existing psychiatric or mental disability who is
* also HIV-positive and who has demonstrated an inability or unwillingness
to engage in safer sexual practices. In Calgary, for example, two such
individuals are being detained indefinitely under public health legislation
and given constant supervision. 148 In New Zealand, a man with an
intellectual disability has been detained for several years for failing to
disclose his HIV status. He was originally charged criminally and given
a suspended sentence. However, this sentence was eventually quashed
and he has been detained indefinitely since 1999 in a health facility under
147. In one case in this sample, the complainant was a young woman with the cognitive ability of a
child in grade two. See Lamirande, supra note 56, where the Manitoba Court of Appeal overturned the
sentence of forty months and gave the accused a conditional sentence. The trial judge had noted that
the guilty plea was made necessary by the unreliability of the complainant as a witness. It was this fact
that led the trial judge to conclude, in rejecting a joint submission for a conditional sentence, that the
complainant's particular vulnerability made the accused especially culpable. (R. v. Lamirande (2006),
199 Man. R. (2d) 299 at para. 35 cited in Lamirande, supra note 56 at para. 18).
148. One has been diagnosed with schizophrenia the other with fetal alcohol syndrome. The individuals
are in a community facility and one of them goes out to work supervised on a regular basis. Telephone
interview with Barbara Ross, Manager, Harm Reduction & Special Projects, Calgary Health Region
(13 June 2007).
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the New Zealand Health Act, 4 9 apparently at a cost over double that of
imprisonment in a maximum-security prison in New Zealand. 150
It should also be recognized that criminalizing one aspect of the
transmission of HIV may have repercussions for the criminalization of
other forms of transmission. For example, what about the HIV-positive
woman who declines to take AZT during her pregnancy and gives birth.
to an HIV-positive child? 5' There are also questions surrounding criminal
liability for the sharing of needles by drug users and the transmission of
HIV through medical procedures.15 2
Some commentators 15 3 argue that sexual transmission should only be
criminalized where the accused actually intends to transmit the virus, not
where the intention is merely to have unprotected sex. 54 This distinction
is difficult to draw, however, in part because of the challenge of proving
that an individual's purpose was to transmit the virus but also because
the distinction between the deliberate and the unintentional is not clear-
cut. For example, what about the person whose purpose is to have sex,
who knows that there is a significant risk of transmitting the virus, but
simply does not care about that risk? On the other hand, what about
the person who wants to transmit the virus but who knows that HIV is
not necessarily transmitted by every act of unprotected sex? Is there an
important difference in blameworthiness between these two? Is there a
legally significant difference between the person who says "I'm going to
149. "Truscott's Sentence Cut After Fifth Escape" The Press (Christchurch) (15 June 2001) 6; Joanna
Norris, "Placement of Patient Challenged" The Press (Christchurch) (30 December 2004) 4.
150. "$355,000 to keep gay man isolated" The Dominion (Wellington) (16 December 2000) 12. For
a description of this case see Alastair MacDonald & Heather Worth, "Mad and Bad: HIV Infection,
Mental Illness, Intellectual Disability, and the Law" (2005) 2 Sex. Research & Soc. Pol'y: J. of
N.S.R.C. 51. The authors cite studies suggesting that high-risk sexual behaviours are more common
among persons with major mental disorders and persons with psychiatric illnesses are more likely
than others to be HIV-infected. As mentioned above, courts in Ontario and British Columbia have
taken different positions on whether a person who is HIV-positive can be detained under mental health
legislation on the basis that they have a mental disorder which makes it more likely that they will
transmit HIV. See Chambers, supra note 28, and Mitchell, supra note 25.
151. We have already seen one case in Hamilton of a mother [an immigrant from Africa] whose
children have been permanently removed from her care and who has been convicted of failing to
provide the necessities of life to her newbom child on the basis that, having followed medical advice
during her first pregnancy, she failed to tell her doctors during her second delivery that she was
HIV-positive. Her second child went on to test positive for HIV. R. v. Ifejika, 2006 ONCJ 356 2006
CarswellOnt 5911. She was sentenced to six months served conditionally in the community followed
by three years probation.
152. See e.g. Catherine Waldby et al., "Medical Vectors: Surgical HIV Transmission and the Location
of Culpability" (2005) 2 Sex. Research & Soc. Pol'y: J. of N.S.R.C. 23.
153. Elliott, "Criminal Law, Public Health and HIV Transmission," supra note II at 27.
154. The California HIV statute adopts this position. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 120291 (West
2007).
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give HIV to everyone I can"'155 and the person who simply says "I don't
care how many people I infect"?
III. Legal options for addressing non-disclosure
Public health and criminal law measures are the two primary mechanisms
for state involvement in the failure to disclose one's HIV status. In this
section I examine our existing public health mechanisms and explore some
of the options for criminalization.
1. Public health
The most obvious alternative to criminalization is to rely exclusively on
the public health system to facilitate disclosure and safer sex practices.
The effectiveness (or lack thereof) of provincial public health legislation
plays an important role in assessing the appropriate response to those
who fail to disclose their HIV status. The Federal/Provincial/Territorial
Advisory Committee on HIV/AIDS identified the advantages of resort to
a public health system over the use of criminal law:
* Public health provides greater scope for prevention and more
opportunities for surveillance of HIV
* Confidentiality is maintained to a greater extent in a public health
approach
* There is less stigmatization of persons with HIV
* H1V is less likely to be driven underground in a public health
framework.156
It is important to note at the outset that public health law works best
when those subject to it are cooperative. While public health legislation
has coercive mechanisms for use in extreme cases, the various provincial
regimes are structured around cooperative measures and prevention and
detection at a community level.'57
155. These words by an accused were apparently used to convict him of first-degree assault because
they proved his intention to spread the virus; see Fefer, supra note 131.
156. Ronda Bessner, "Persons who Fail to Disclose their HIV/AIDS Status: Conclusions Reached
by an Expert Working Group" (1 March 2005) 31:5 Canada Communicable Disease Report, online:
Public Health Agency of Canada <http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/publicat/ccdr-rmtc/05vol3 l/dr3 I 05ea.
html>.
157. See Leslie E. Wolf & Richard Vezina, "Crime and Punishment: Is There a Role for Criminal
Law in HIV Prevention Policy?" (2003-2004) 25 Whittier L. Rev. 821 at 831.
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The scope of public health powers is linked to the classification of
the disease type. For example, in most provinces,' 58 HIV is designated
as a "reportable" or "communicable" disease. When dealing with more
easily transmissible "virulent" diseases, the power to prevent transmission
is more far-reaching.
The goal of public health law, in this context, is to stem the spread of
HIV/AIDS and to facilitate treatment, education, and contact tracing. There
are provisions relating to HIV-positive individuals who refuse treatment,
such as the taking of blood samples and bodily fluids without consent,
as well as the power to communicate confidential health information to
family members for the protection of their health.
Provincial public health laws all include some form of written order
or "warrant" issued by a public health official requiring an HIV-positive
individual to "take or refrain from taking an action."'159 These written
orders can range from requiring an individual to submit to forced medical
treatment, 160 mandatory counselling,' 6' or to desist from any activity that
may spread HIV. 62 A written order may require an individual to refrain
from having unsafe sex, or to disclose his or her HIV status prior to
engaging in sexual relations. If an individual fails to adhere to a written
order, several provinces 63 include powers to detain or isolate identified
individuals for an indefinite period of time.'6
The Ontario Health Protection and Promotion Act allows a medical
officer of health to issue a written order requiring a person to "take, or to
refrain from taking, any action."' 65 According to a 1996 study, forty-five
written orders were issued from 1985 to the end of 1993 to HIV-positive
158. For the statutory language see Health Act Communicable Disease Regulation, B.C. Reg. 4/83;
Health Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. H-2 at s. 6(1)(o); Communicable Diseases Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. C-26
at section 2(a) [Newfoundland and Labrador Diseases Act]; Communicable Disease Regulations,
R.R.N.W.T. 1990, c. P-13, s. 1.1 [Northwest Territories and Nunavut Diseases Regulations];
Specification of Communicable Diseases Regulation, 0. Reg. 558/91; Public Health Act, R.S.P.E.I.
1988, c. P-30, s. 1(b); Public Health Act, S.S. 1994, c. p-37.1 at s. 2(0 [Saskatchewan Health Act];
Public Health and Safety Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 176, s. 1.
159. Ontario Health Protection and Promotion Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H-7, s. 22(1)(3) [IPPA].
160. Newfoundland and Labrador Diseases Act, supra note 158, s. 15.
161. Saskatchewan Health Act, supra note 158, s. 34(1).
162. HPPA, supra note 1, s. 22(3).
163. See e.g. Communicable Disease Regulation, Alta. Reg. 238/85; British Columbia Health Act,
R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 179; Northwest Territories and Nunavut Diseases Regulations, supra note 158;
Diseases and Dead Bodies Regulation, Man. Reg. 338/88R.
164. Public Health Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. P-13, s. 40(1) [Public Health Act (Alberta)].
165. HPPA, supra note 159, s. 22.
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individuals. 166 In comparison, between 1999 and 2003, at least fifty-five
such orders were issued. 167
In 2003, a working group of experts in the field of HIV/AIDS,
organized by the Federal/Provincial/Territorial Advisory Committee on
HIV/AIDS, endorsed the Calgary Health Region's model for dealing with
non-disclosure of HIV status. 168 This model begins with the least intrusive
approach and continues through various steps each of which involves
increasingly more coercive intervention. Initial efforts focus on counselling
and education, then move to the provision of services, to a public health
order to an apprehension order and/or isolation order, and finally, where
all else has failed, the possibility of criminal liability.
Public health orders specify the conditions under which the individual
with HIV must disclose his status and the steps that must be taken to protect
sexual partners.'69 If those measures fail, more intrusive conditions can be
applied mandating treatment and disclosure and prohibiting particular sex
acts. 70 Should this order not be sufficient, an apprehension order can be
issued providing for the person to be arrested and evaluated at a health
institution. This apprehension expires after seven days unless an isolation
order is imposed.171 With an isolation order, the person must be re-examined
every seven days to determine whether release is appropriate. 72 Finally,
punitive proceedings can be brought under Alberta's Public Health Act for
violating a medical order. If criminal action is warranted, the guidelines
suggest the offence of public nuisance, which has a maximum penalty
of two years imprisonment. 73 Calgary currently has two HIV-positive
individuals, both with pre-existing mental disabilities, who are required
by the Medical Officer of Health to live in a facility and be under twenty-
four-hour supervision. 74
166. Richard Elliott, "Public Health and 'The Unwilling and Unable' (1996) 2 Can. HIV/AIDS
Pol'y & Law Newsletter.
167. This data is for thirty-one Ontario health units, out of a possible thirty-seven. There is no
available data for the number issued between 1993 and 1999. Debbie Sheehan, "Use of Section 22s
for Individuals Who Are HIV Positive: Ontario Public Health Unit Benchmarking Survey" (2005)
[unpublished, on file with author].
168. Bessner, supra note 156.
169. These orders are governed by Public Health Act (Alberta), supra note 164, s. 29.
170. Telephone interview with Barbara Ross, Manager, Harm Reduction & Special Projects, Calgary
Health Region (13 June 2007); Public Health Act (Alberta), ibid., s. 29.
171. Public Health Act (Alberta), ibid., ss. 40-41.
172. Ibid., s. 44.
173. Bessner, supra note 156.
174. Apparently both are unable to take the necessary measures to prevent transmission of HIV. See,
supra note 149.
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Given the incurability of HIV/AIDS it is difficult to see the
circumstances under which, short of the death of the individual involved,
a public health order could be rescinded. In Ontario, for example, an order
under section 22 of the Health Protection and Promotion Act' has no
time limits and no mechanism for determining whether the order should
be lifted. A 1997 report by the Ontario Advisory Committee on HIV/
AIDS concluded that "the endpoint of a section 22 order against a person
with HIV would be the adoption of behaviors that minimize or eliminate
the risk of disease transmission to others. '176 There are also jurisdictional
issues. An order made in one province may not be enforceable in another.
Difficulties can even arise if the individual in question moves from one
health region to another. Public health mechanisms are less likely to
provide the procedural and evidentiary protections available to an accused
in the criminal justice system. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the
right to a full hearing are not part of the public health regime.
Coercive public health measures work best where there is a definable
illness that can be treated and cured within a reasonable period of time
throughout which the individual is detained. HIV/AIDS is a lifetime
problem and cannot be dealt with by a short period of detention. Similarly,
forced treatment is not a feasible solution because anti-retroviral drugs
have to be taken on a regular schedule and for life. Quarantine is also not
realistic with an illness that is not very easily transmitted. Monetary fines
provided for by some public health legislation seem pointless in achieving
the goal of full disclosure, not to .mention the fact that many people with
HIV/AIDS are already economically disadvantaged.'77
Those whose behaviour public health efforts can modify are those for
whom criminal law is unnecessary. However, public health measures and
the threat of criminalization probably both fail to alter the behaviour of
those few who need their behaviour modified the most. An individual who
refuses to follow the advice given by public health officials and doctors
regarding disclosure and safer sex practices may well not be influenced by
an order requiring such practices. In a large majority of the cases discussed
in this paper, public health measures, including orders to refrain from
175. Section 22 orders are similar to the public health orders discussed above. These orders are limited
to whatever is "reasonable and probable" to address the health risk that the individual embodies.
HPPA, supra note 159, s. 22(2)(c).
176. Ontario Advisory Committee on HIV/AIDS, "Reducing HIV Transmission by People with
HIV Who Are Unwilling or Unable To Take Appropriate Precautions" (Toronto: Ontario Advisory
Committee on HIV/AIDS, 1997) at 18.
177. Monetary fines were imposed in Ssenyonga but were not paid.
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high-risk conduct, had been invoked against the accused before criminal
charges were laid.
There is no question that public health law is a better model for dealing
with the majority of individuals who are attempting to adapt to their illness
responsibly. Public health law is not particularly well suited, however, to
change the behaviour of the small population of individuals who fail to
disclose their HIV status in the face of clear ordersto do so. We can only
hope that putting adequate resources into education and support services
will keep this number of individuals at a minimum. The outstanding
question is how to deal with the small group of individuals for whom
public law regimes are ineffective.
2. Criminal law
There is a small range of cases in which the use of criminal law is a necessary
last resort because the potential harm to complainants from failure to
disclose is very serious and interferes with their health and autonomy in
a profound way. Failure to disclose can also disproportionately affect
women who are at greater risk of HIV from heterosexual sex and who
are less likely to be able to insist on condom use. Requiring disclosure
does not put an undue burden on the accused. If an accused finds it too
difficult to disclose his or her HIV status, he or she should simply avoid
unprotected sexual intercourse.
The question then arises of what form of criminalization is most
appropriate: should HIV-specific statutes be enacted, as a majority
of American states have done, or is it more appropriate to prosecute
persons under existing criminal provisions? In the United States, twenty-
nine states have enacted specific laws to criminalize various forms of
transmission and/or exposure to HIV' 78 The vague language and wide
range of punishments adopted by various state legislatures have led to
178. This number includes all states that specifically mention HIV or refer to STIs generally. It
excludes states that only prohibit the specific activity of blood and organ donation by HfV-positive
individuals. See Ala. Code § 22-IIA-21 (2007); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-123 (West 2007); Cal. Health
& Safety Code § 120291 (West 2007); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-7-201.7 (West 2007); Fla. Stat. § 384.24
(West 2007); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-60 (West 2007); Idaho Code § 39-608 (West 2007); I11. Comp.
Stat. ch. 720, § 5/12-16.2 (West 2007); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-1-9 (West 2007); Iowa Code § 709C. I
(West 2007); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3435 (2006); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 529.090 (West 2007); La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 14:43.5 (West 2007); Md. Health-Gen. § 18-601.1 (West 2007); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 333.5210 (West 2007); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 191.677 (West 2007); Mont. Code Ann. § 50-18-112 (2005);
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 201.205 (West 2007); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:34-5 (West 2007); N.Y. Public
Health Law § 2307 (West 2007); N. Dak. Cent. Code § 12.1-20-17 (Bender 2005); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 2903.11 (West 2007); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1192.1 (West 2007); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 5902
(West 2007); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-29-145 (2006); S. Dak. Codified Laws § 22-18-31 (2007); Tenn.
Code Ann. § 39-13-109 (West 2007); Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1309 (West 2007); Va. Code Ann. §
18.2-67.4:1 (West 2007); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.36.011 (West 2007).
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constitutional challenges of HIV-specific statutes in six states, all of which
have been unsuccessful. 179
There is a range of behaviours criminalized by HIV-specific statutes
in the United States. Some narrower statutes, such as that in California, I0
require a specific intent to transmit HIV, as opposed to a disregard of the
risks, while others require proof that the accused knew not only that he or
she was infected but also that his or her actions were likely to transmit the
virus."'81 The California statute only applies to unprotected sexual activity
whereas the vast majority of states do not distinguish between protected and
unprotected sexual activity. Other states have more expansive legislation,
such as Tennessee which only requires the HIV-positive individual to
knowingly engage in intimate contact. Any evidence of consent from the
at-risk party must be presented as an affirmative defence with the burden
of proof on the accused.182
The penalties attached to these statutes also vary widely, although
not necessarily according to the seriousness of the conduct criminalized.
The Maryland offence, for example, is a misdemeanour with a maximum
three years imprisonment, even though the offence requires the accused to
knowingly transfer or attempt to transfer HIV 83 This requirement is more
onerous for the prosecution than Tennessee's offence, which is a Class B
felony carrying a sentence of fifteen to thirty years.' In Iowa, the offence
is comprised of the same elements and carries a similar sentence to the
Tennessee statute but with the additional consequence of having to register
as a sex offender.'85
Virtually all states also use general criminal law provisions to prosecute
non-disclosure of HIV. There does not appear to be a significant difference
in punishment between the HIV-specific and the general criminal offences.
Nor do HIV-specific offences appear to have increased the number of
prosecutions, at least in the early days. In a 2001 study of the criminal
HIV exposure prosecutions, there was no relationship found between
the number of prosecutions for HIV exposure and whether the state used
179. See Illinois v. Russell, 630 N.E.2d 794 (I11. 1994); Iowa v. Keene, 629 N.W.2d 360 (Iowa 2001);
Missouri v. Mahan, 971 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. 1998); Guevara v. Superior Ct. (Cal.), 62 Cal. App. 4th 864
(App. 61 Dist. 1998); Louisiana v. Gamberella, 633 So. 2d 595 (La. App. i Cir. 1993); Washington v.
Stark, 832 P.2d 109 (Wash. App. 1992).
180. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 120291 (West 2007).
181. Fla. Stat. § 384.24 (West 2007).
182. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-109 (West 2007).
183. Md. Health-Gen. CodeAnn. § 18-601.1 (West 2007).
184. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-109, § 40-35-112 (West 2007).
185. Iowa Code § 709C.1 (West 2007).
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general criminal law or an HIV specific statute. HIV-specific statutes only
accounted for one-third of all convictions. 8 6
Is an HIV-specific offence the best option for Canada? Since the
Supreme Court of Canada has opened up prosecutions for sexual assault,
aggravated assault and aggravated sexual assault, and given the availability
of the offence of nuisance, there is little need in Canada for an HIV-specific
offence. HIV offences run the risk of being found discriminatory because
they select out one medical condition, and not even the most transmissible
condition, for criminal sanction. Furthermore, because of the demographics
of HIV/AIDS, such laws run the risk of selecting out particularly vulnerable
populations for criminal sanction. In the United States, for example, there
are states that single out HIV-positive sex workers for criminalization. 18 7
Concerns about the use of HIV-specific offences are cogently articulated
in the following article:
The creation of new laws specific to HIV is also worrisome because it
isolates a single disease as uniquely unmanageable. Legal and medical
reasoning works largely by analogy, a feature that works to protect
specific diseases and individuals from becoming exceptional and
stigmatized. The construction of AIDS-specific law, however, suggests
that, in this case, there is no analogical situation - a dangerous move
on the part of our public health and legal systems, both because it is
harder to repeal than to pass laws and because this new construction of
exceptionality Will not only affect AIDS policy for many years to come it
also defines a new paradigm for future legal responses to other diseases
that may present.' 8
The United Nations in its International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and
Human Rights, while opposed to criminalization, recommends that if
criminalization is to be implemented it should be through general criminal
laws and not HIV-specific statutes.'89
The advantages ofa legislative option are obvious: clarity, predictability,
and notice to potential accused persons. Nonetheless, if one looks at the
history of criminalization in this area, legislation usually adds to the
scope of criminal liability rather than narrowing it. The previous private
186. Zita Lazzarini, Sarah Bray & Scott Burris "Evaluating the Impact of Criminal Laws on HIV Risk
Behaviour" (2002) 30 J.L. Med. & Ethics 239 at 247.
187. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-7-201.7 (West 2007); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 5902 (West 2007); Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-1309 (West 2007).
188. Worth, Patton & Goldstein, supra note 132 at 4.
189. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Joint United Nations
Programme on HIV/AIDS. International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights, 2006
Consolidated Version, UNAIDS at 29.
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members' bills introduced in the Canadian Parliament on this issue, for
example, were both more expansive than the law as set out in Cuerrier. 90
One of the problems with the existing state of the law in Canada is the
degree of prosecutorial discretion regarding which cases to prosecute and
with what charges. As we have seen, charges range from common nuisance
to first-degree murder for virtually the same conduct. In between these
two extremes are sexual assault, criminal negligence offences, aggravated
assault, and aggravated sexual assault. The range of sentences is likewise
enormous. Whether an accused will have to register as a sex offender may
also depend on the charge laid. 91 This discretion might seem to militate in
favour of a specific law dealing with failure to disclose one's HIV status in
order to provide consistency. However the American experience suggests
that the existence of HIV-specific laws does not necessarily discourage
prosecutions under general criminal offences. In fact they may simply
add one more tool to a prosecutor's arsenal, leading to an even wider net
of criminalization.
If we reject the need for an HIV-specific law, how should existing
Criminal Code provisions be utilized most effectively? It is clear that
the Supreme Court of Canada in Cuerrier was determined to find a
mechanism for prosecuting the failure-to-disclose cases within the existing
law. The potential for expansion of the definition of fraud was the most
straightforward option. As we have seen, one of the most difficult issues
in the fraud context relates to the Court's requirement of a significant risk
of serious bodily harm to negate consent, which in turn makes prosecution
more difficult where the complainant tests HIV-positive.
There are arguments in support of maintaining the significant risk
requirement. By requiring the Crown to prove that the complainant was
HIV-negative at the time she or he had unprotected sex with the accused, we
will limit prosecutions to cases involving the most serious endangerment,
assuming that people who are HIV-negative are endangered more than
those who are not.
190. There have been two private member's bills. Bill C-290, An Act to amend the Criminal Code
(exposure to Human Immunodeficiency Virus), 2nd Sess., 33rd Pan., cl. 1, which did not pass first
reading after its introduction on 2 May 1988, criminalized "knowing" exposure with a maximum
sentence of two years imprisonment. Bill C-354, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (transmission
of HIV), 1st Sess., 35th ParI., cl. 1, which passed a first reading on October 25, 1995 but did not
get to second reading, would have criminalized all sexual intercourse and any potential bodily fluid
transmission for HIV-positive individuals regardless of whether the transmission is known to transmit
HIV. For example, dry kissing could result in seven years imprisonment, whereas partaking in proven
modes of transmission could lead to life in prison. This bill also proposed preventing consent as an
available defence. See Richard Elliott, Criminal Law and HIV/AIDS, supra note 26.
191. See SOIRA, supra note 82.
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However, it makes no sense to convict an accused of an attempt
where the virus is transmitted but of the completed offence where it is
not. Determining whether the complainant was HIV-negative at the time
of the sexual relationship will inevitably transform trials into a forum for
airing the sexual history of complainants, which can only add to their
traumatization. Until we are sure that these complainants cannot be harmed
by further exposure to HIV, excluding them from the scope of culpability
is problematic. If we say that proving the complainant was HIV-negative
is an element of the actus reus, there could be a corresponding mens rea
component that the accused must have known that the complainant was
HIV-negative, an element that could add more digging into the sexual
history and behaviour of the complainant and could rely heavily on
stereotyped assumptions. Retaining the significant risk of serious bodily
harm requirement suggests that there is a duty to disclose one's HIV status
only to partners who are HIV-negative, an unworkable standard on which
persons with HIV can base their sexual behaviour. The duty to disclose
should not depend upon the the HIV status of the complainant.
On balance, I would recommend that we reject the requirement of
a significant risk of serious bodily harm in order to negate consent. I
realize that removing this requirement has the potential to broaden the
scope of liability, although only for the lowest offence of sexual assault
because endangerment would have to be proven for aggravated assault or
aggravated sexual assault.
The Supreme Court of Canada to date has shown no inclination to
remove this requirement. There are, however, other options. For example,
if the Court is wedded to the requirement of a risk of significant harm
as a way of limiting fraud generally, it could develop the possibility
raised in Williams (and adopted by Wells C.J. in the Court of Appeal) that
unprotected vaginal or anal intercourse always endangers an unknowing
complainant whether or not the Crown can prove the complainant was
HIV-negative at the time. Thus, by definition, unprotected sex by an
accused who is HIV-positive and knows the risks would, in the absence of
disclosure, constitute sexual assault. 192
Parliament, unlike the Supreme Court, is not constrained by Cuerrier
and Williams. As discussed, it could enact an HIV-specific offence. In
order to be seen as a compromise between these statutory offences and
the status quo, Parliament could work with Cuerrier and expand the
192. If the harm requirement is maintained, it is important to recognize that bodily harm includes
psychological harm. See the definition of bodily harm in section 2 of the Code and R. v. McCraw,
[1991] 3 S.C.R 72.
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legislative definition of non-consent in the sexual assault context to deal
with these cases. Section 273.1(2) sets out certain circumstances where no
consent is obtained for the purposes of sexual assault. This section, for
example, states that there is no consent where the complainant is incapable
of consent or if the accused abused a position of trust, power, or authority.
A provision could be added thatprovides no consent is obtained where the
accused, knowing that he carries a sexually transmitted disease, engages
in unprotected vaginal or anal sex without disclosing his medical status
to the complainant. The advantage of this option is that it gets away
from concerns about an overly broad definition of fraud to apply in other
contexts. Such a provision would not be limited to HIV but could apply
to all sexually transmitted diseases. The majority of cases could then be
prosecuted under simple sexual assault without the causation obstacles
created by the Supreme Court of Canada's definition of fraud. Sexual
assault is the most appropriate charge because it respects the autonomy of
the complainant to decide with whom to engage in sexual activity. Sexual
assault also has more appropriate penalties than aggravated sexual assault
and removes the need to track every sexual partner of the complainant. In
the most extreme cases, where it could be proven that the complainant was
infected by the accused the more serious charge of sexual assault causing
bodily harm or aggravated sexual assault could be considered. 93
Conclusion
The decision of whether or not to criminalize non-disclosure forces us
to confront the values we expect our criminal justice system to uphold.
Deterrence in this context is too speculative; incapacitation may just
shift the risk to another vulnerable population in our penitentiaries and
rehabilitation is not even on the table. We are left with retribution and the
denunciatory function of law as the primary purposes of criminalization in
this context. I do not want to minimize the importance of these functions.
No one would suggest, for example, that we decriminalize sexual assault
because of its uncertain deterrent value. However, the criminalization of
sexual assault generally does not implicate the potential problems which
arise out of the criminalization of non-disclosure of one's HIV status: the
possibility of driving HIV-positive individuals away from counselling
193. Even though it might seem inconsistent with my recommendations on significant harm, I would
exclude from liability cases in which a condom was used because the public interest in promoting the
use of condoms outweighs the public interest in criminalizing the failure to disclose where a condom is
used. See Swiss Institute of Comparative Law, Comparative Study on Discrimination against Persons
with HIVorAIDS (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1993), which concluded that non-disclosure should
not be criminalized if safer sex precautions were used.
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and education and adding to the stigma they already experience. One
commentator has even suggested that current patterns of criminalization
Will drive potential accused away from long-term, stable relationships
towards the anonymous one-night stands which are less likely to be
* prosecuted. 194
Despite the arguments against criminalization, I am repeatedly brought
back to the complainants whose lives have been devastated by the callous
betrayal of someone they may have loved and trusted, and the real threat to
their health. Some complainants probably could and should have insisted
on condom use; others were not in a position to do so. While not every
betrayal between intimate partners should be criminalized, the failure
to disclose one's HIV status in the context of unprotected sex creates a
serious risk of harm imposed knowingly by the accused.
Criminal law is a blunt instrument and should be limited, in this
context, to those accused who demonstrate a pattern of non-disclosure,
either with one complainant over time or with more than one complainant,
and a failure to practice safer sex. The criminal law should not be invoked
unless public health measures have been exhausted and have failed to
modify the behayiour of the potential accused. Requiring that public health
measures be utilized first will ensure that criminal proceedings are only
.brought against persons who are aware of their HIV status, who are aware
of the dangers of unprotected sex, and who have been cautioned about the
consequences of failing to take preventive measures. Clear prosecutorial
guidelines should be developed in every province and territory to ensure
a cautious approach to laying charges in this area.' 95 The dangers of over-
criminalization must be kept front and centre when deciding who should
be prosecuted. 96
The move towards criminalization has been entrenched by our courts
and is unlikely to be reversed. We nonetheless must be realistic about what
criminalization can accomplish. It is not likely that criminalization will
encourage many more people to disclose their HIV-positive status nor is it
likely to discourage the spread of HIV in society. As one jurist put it: "[o]
ver-enthusiasm [in] enacting laws on AIDS may make some people feel
better. But it will have precious little impact on controlling the spread of
194. See e.g. Waldby et aL, supra note 152.
195. One possibility might be able to require the consent of the provincial Attorney General before
laying charges.
196. See also David L. McColgin & Elizabeth T. Hey, "Criminal law" in David Webber, ed., AIDS
and the Law, 3d ed. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.) 259 at 262.
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this epidemic."'97 At best, criminalization results in the incarceration of a
small number of persons for whom the public health system and its powers
are inadequate to control their sexual behaviour, and perhaps provides
some small measure of justice for some complainants. Criminalization
also sends a message about the behaviours society refuses to tolerate.
Ultimately, whatever option we adopt, it will fall to police and Crown
prosecutors to use the criminal law in this context with great restraint.
I would argue that murder charges are excessive in this context given
the uncertainties surrounding transmissibility, treatment, and prognosis.
Murder is our most serious crime and should be reserved for our most
serious offenders.
At the outset of this paper, I raised an apparent contradiction in the
recent trend in Canada towards harsher forms of criminalization. On the
one hand, we are coming to recognize that HIV/AIDS is a disease process
and not a moral judgment. We are also learning that, with timely access to
medication, being HIV-positive is not necessarily a death sentence. On the
other hand, the frequency and severity of charges laid in the non-disclosure
context appear to be on the rise with charges as serious as aggravated sexual
assault and murder now being laid. How can this apparent contradiction
be reconciled? Part of the answer probably lies in the fact that the Supreme
Court of Canada has opened the door to very serious charges. However,
there may be more to it. I would suggest that the increasing severity of
criminal sanctions may be a result of the fact that HIV/AIDS is no longer
seen as merely "a gay disease"-or a disease of IV drug users. It is now
potentially a disease that can affect anyone. That a large majority of
Canadian prosecutions involve heterosexual couples, and not gay men,
IV drug users or women involved in prostitution, highlights the fact that
certain groups as complainants may have better access to justice than
others. In cases where convictions were not obtained, it is not unusual to
see references to the complainant's promiscuity or other related behaviour
that reflects on his or her credibility. It would appear from the Canadian
data that cases in which complainants represent middle-class Canada are
more likely to be prosecuted and more likely to result in a conviction. In
some ways, HIV/AIDS may be more frightening now precisely because
the "us" and "them" dichotomy has broken down.
HIV/AIDS deals with the breakdown of boundaries. Medically, it
affects the immune system, the body's boundary against illness. Socially,
it has artificially, and unjustifiably, created boundaries around certain
197. Mr. Justice Michael Kirby, "Legal implications of AIDS" (1990) 16 Commonwealth L. Bull. 620
at 627.
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groups. Legally, it implicates the boundaries between public health and
criminal law. While I have concluded that the criminal law has a role to
play in some cases of non-disclosure, those responsible for administering
criminal justice must be cautious about creating further boundaries and
must ensure that the force of the state is used with caution and justice.
